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The Uncertain Future of Limited Fund Settlement Class
Actions in Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp.
When a body possessed of the institutional unflappability of the
United States Supreme Court is moved to describe a body of
litigation as "elephantine,"' it is safe to assume the problem is real.
The pachyderm that sparked the Court's alarm is asbestos litigation.2
Asbestos is a fire-resistant insulator that also happens to be one of the
most dangerous materials ever introduced into widespread use.' By
1. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295,2302 (1999).
2. The staggering scope of the asbestos litigation crisis seems to invite such creative
metaphor. It has been described as a "rising tide," id., a "flood," REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITrEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2-3 (1991)
[hereinafter 1991 REPORT], a "torrent," Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6
F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1993), a "tidal wave," David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America:
A Story of Asbestos-Carnage, Cover-Up, and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1698
(1986) (book review), an "avalanche," Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th
Cir. 1986), a "massive, unending river," John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of
the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1384 (1995), an "odyssey" of
"aimless wandering through the legal wilderness," Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp.
649, 650 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd and remanded in part, vacated and remanded in part, rev'd
and rendered in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998), and a "cauldron[o of sticky, bubbly, and
ill-smelling trouble[]," Greg M. Zipes, After Amchem and Ahearm The Rise of
Bankruptcy Over the Class Action Option for Resolving Mass Torts on a Nationwide Basis,
and the Fall of Finality?, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 7, 8 (1998). Perhaps no court or
commentator has outdone the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which began an
opinion as follows:
In this, the last decade of the 20th Century, our judicial system faces an
apocalypse in the guise of asbestos cases. As did the "Apocalyptic beast,"
asbestos rose up "as from the depths of the sea," after having lain dormant for
decades, to plague our industries initially and our judicial system consequentially.
Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 578 A.2d 228, 231 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (quoting
VICENTE BLASCO IBANEZ, THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE 172 (Charlotte
Brewster Jordan trans., 1918)), affd in part and rev'd in part, 604 A.2d 445 (Md. 1992).
3. See 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-7. Asbestos is a naturally occurring fibrous
mineral, mined primarily for its noncombustability and its insulative properties. See 1
SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING
ASPECTS A1-A7 (George A. Peters & Barbara J. Peters eds., 1980). The first known
English language report on the health dangers posed by asbestos was issued in 1898, see
Morris Greenberg, Knowledge of the Health Hazards of Asbestos (The First 60 Years), in
10 SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: CURRENT ASBESTOS LEGAL, MEDICAL AND
TECHNICAL RESEARCH 145, 149 (George A. Peters & Barbara J. Peters eds., 1994), and
these dangers were first scientifically demonstrated in the United States in 1935, see 1991
REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. Although asbestos exposure remains a major public health
problem in many countries, it has been substantially reduced in the United States. See
BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 787-95, 854-55 (4th
MASS TORT LITIGATION
the middle of the next century, as many as 500,000 Americans will
have died as a result of asbestos exposure.4 As a committee of federal
judges dramatically reported in 1991, "[i]t is a tale of danger known in
the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of Americans in the 1940s
and 1950s, injuries that began to take their toll in the 1960s, and a
flood of lawsuits beginning in the 1970s."
That flood of lawsuits-approximately 250,000 to date-has
swollen into a well-documented legal catastrophe on par with its
public health predicate. 6  The sheer volume of claims brought by
those exposed to asbestos has made it increasingly difficult for courts
to provide, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate, "the
just, speedy,7 and inexpensive' determination of every action."9  As
ed. 1996). But see Rebecca Renner, Asbestos in the Air, SCI. AM., Feb. 2000, at 34, 34
(reporting that a recent housing boom in California is exposing residents to dangerous
levels of naturally occurring asbestos).
4. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1384-85. One study has projected that cancer caused
by asbestos exposure will result in one American death every hour until 2025. See
CASTLEMAN, supra note 3, at 784. The most serious disease caused by asbestos exposure
is mesothelioma, a particularly virulent cancer generally thought to be caused only by
asbestos. See Federal Judicial Ctr., Individual Characteristics of Mass Torts Case
Congregations, in REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, app. D at 16 (1999) [hereinafter
MASS TORT LITIGATION]. Some recent medical research suggests that a virus that
contaminated the polio vaccine administered to nearly 100 million Americans in the 1950s
and 1960s plays a role in triggering mesothelioma. See Joseph R. Testa et al., A Multi-
Institutional Study Confirms the Presence and Expression of Simian Virus 40 in Human
Malignant Mesotheliomas, 58 CANCER RES. 4505, 4505-09 (1998); Debbie Bookchin &
Jim Schumacher, The Virus and the Vaccine, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2000, at 68, 75.
Monkey kidneys used to culture the vaccine are the apparent source of the viral
contamination. See Bookchin & Schumacher, supra, at 68. The Testa study and others
like it remain controversial. See id. at 71-72, 76-80.
5. 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3.
6. See generally, e.g., Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2324-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (detailing
problems posed by the volume of asbestos litigation); 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-3,
7-14 (describing the volume, delay, and costs of asbestos litigation); Coffee, supra note 2,
at 1384-1404 (tracing the evolution of asbestos litigation); Federal Judicial Ctr., supra note
4, app. D at 14-17 (summarizing past and present asbestos litigation); Report of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working Group on Mass Torts [hereinafter
1999 Report], in MASS TORT LITGATION, supra note 4, at 28-47 (describing difficulties
presented by mass tort litigation generally). The magnitude of asbestos litigation is
illustrated by the fact that 60% of the increase in federal civil filings from 1976 to 1986 was
attributable to asbestos cases. See Mary J. Davis, Mass Tort Litigation: Congress's Silent,
but Deadly, Reform Effort, 64 TENN. L. REV. 913, 918 (1997). The volume of asbestos
cases has been so great, one court observed, "as to exert a well-nigh irresistible pressure to
bend the normal rules." In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir.
1995).
7. See, e.g., 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that the delays that have
characterized the resolution of asbestos cases "raise legitimate concerns about whether
some plaintiffs are de facto denied any meaningful access to court"). Such delay can exact
a tragic price: during one asbestos class action, nearly one-sixth of the class members died
2000]
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one trial judge illustrated the problem in a 1990 opinion approving an
asbestos class action: "If the Court could somehow close thirty cases
a month, it would take six and one-half years to try these cases and
there would be pending over 5,000 untouched cases." 10 For the tens
of thousands whose injuries will become manifest in the decades
ahead, there is a very real risk that recovery will be denied
altogether."
To make matters worse, asbestos is not the only elephant in the
stampede. Indeed, asbestos exposure is only the first, and so far the
worst, 2 of what have come to be termed "mass torts. 13 One recent
study has documented two dozen subsequent mass torts,' 4 and there is
little optimism that mass torts are headed the way of the woolly
waiting for their cases to be heard. See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 651-52. As a committee ofjudges appointed to study the asbestos crisis grimly noted, "[u]nder these circumstances,
the principle of 'justice delayed is justice denied' has added meaning." 1991 REPORT,
supra note 2, at 12.
8. Perhaps the most oft-cited statistic in the literature of mass torts comes from a
1984 Rand Corporation study which found that only 39 cents of each asbestos litigation
dollar actually went to asbestos victims. See 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 13. Such
inefficiency is far less shocking when viewed in light of evidence from a subsequent Rand
report indicating that the average plaintiff in non-automobile tort litigation receives only
43% of each litigation dollar. See Thomas E. Willging, Mass Tort Problems & Proposals:
A Report to the Mass Torts Working Group, in MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 4,
app. C at 3.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see also Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2325 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the costs and delays of asbestos litigation may deny most victims recovery
unless courts are given maximum discretion to aggregate claims).
10. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 652 (Parker, C.J.).
11. The latency period for mesothelioma, the most serious asbestos-related disease, is
15 to 40 years or more. See Federal Judicial Ctr., supra note 4, app. D at 17. Such a long
and variable latency period increases the likelihood that, absent claim aggregation, an
asbestos manufacturer's assets will be exhausted by prior claims before other victims have
manifested injuries.
12. See Willging, supra note 8, app. C at 25. One state court judge recently suggested
that "'[tobacco litigation has every likelihood of dwarfing the horrendous asbestos
situation.'" Richard B. Schmitt, Alabama Judge Rejects Settlement by Liggett Group on
Smoking Claims, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1999, at B6 (quoting Alabama Circuit Court Judge
Robert Kendall).
13. Notwithstanding Professor McGovern's observation that "[m]ass torts have been
defined in a number of ways, none of which is particularly helpful," Francis E. McGovern,
The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 595, 597
(1997), several such efforts have been made. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A.
Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 961, 965-69 (1993) (defining mass torts as litigation characterized by a
large number of related claims, commonality of issues, and interdependent value of
claims); 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 8-9 (discussing different definitions). For a general
overview of the mass tort phenomenon and the judicial problems that it poses, see 1999
Report, supra note 6, at 9-47.
14. See Federal Judicial Ctr., supra note 4, passim.
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mammoth in the near future.'5
There is near-universal acknowledgment that mass torts pose
grave problems16 for a legal system designed to mete out justice case
by case,17 problems that can be addressed only through some form of
aggregated adjudication.'" What procedural tool accomplishes that
aggregation most appropriately and efficiently? This question is the
central issue in mass tort jurisprudence, and no consensus answer has
emerged.' 9 Opt-out class actions2° under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal
15. See 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 9 (stating that "mass tort litigation is probably
here to stay"); Francis E. McGovern, Looking to the Future of Mass Torts: A Comment on
Schuck and Siliciano, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1025-27 (1995) (examining institutional
factors that perpetuate mass tort litigation). Indeed, by providing the mass tort plaintiffs'
bar with the funds to invest in new mega-cases, the success of asbestos litigation has been a
direct factor in perpetuating mass tort litigation. See Marianne Lavelle & Angie Cannon,
The Reign of the Tort Kings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 1, 1999, at 36, 38 (quoting a
leading plaintiffs' lawyer as saying, "[a]sbestos gave us a war chest for tobacco").
16. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1283 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (1999), available in 1999 WL 796232 (statement of Professor Christopher Edley, Jr.,
Harvard Law School) (arguing that "the asbestos litigation crisis not only remains with us,
but has in important respects grown worse in the late 1990s"); 1999 Report, supra note 6,
at 19 (concluding that mass torts "impose extraordinary demands on the judicial system,
which currently does not possess all the mechanisms necessary to address them"); Coffee,
supra note 2, at 1347 (identifying a consensus on the existence of a crisis requiring a
radical remedy); Willging, supra note 8, at 5 (noting that those who argue that the legal
system can evolve to handle mass torts satisfactorily are a definite minority). But see
Finding Solutions to the Asbestos Litigation Problem: Hearings on S. 758 Before the Senate
Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 106th Cong. (1999), available in
1999 WL 796237 (statement of Richard Middleton, Jr., President, Association of Trial
Lawyers of America) (arguing that, with only 55 asbestos trials in 1998, no asbestos
litigation crisis exists); Willging, supra note 8, at 3-5 (describing arguments that the
current system is working).
17. See 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 15.
18. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDiviDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE
EFFECr OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEvIcES 1-3
(1995); 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 28-29. But see Willging, supra note 8, at 5-6 (noting
some negative consequences of aggregation, primarily the concern that increased
efficiency encourages filings).
19. See Anne E. Cohen, Mass Tort Litigation After Amchem, SC57 ALI-ABA 269,
274,277-78 (1998), available in WL, ALI-ABA database; Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reporting
from the Front Line-One Mediator's Experience with Mass Torts, 31 LOY. L.A. . REV.
359, 363-45 (1998); McGovern, supra note 13, at 595-96 (noting the development of a
"cottage industry of suggestions for various forms of aggregative treatment of mass
torts"); Kevin H. Hudson, Comment, Catch-23(b)(1)(B): The Dilemma of Using the
Mandatory Class Action to Resolve the Problem of the Mass Tort Case, 40 EMORY L.J. 665,
665-69 (1991).
20. A brief overview of class actions procedure may be helpful here. Federal class
action practice is governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A class
action allows individual plaintiffs to sue, not only for themselves, but also on behalf of a
class of those alleging like claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). To sue on behalf of others,
individual plaintiffs must obtain permission from the court, known as class certification.
See id. 23(c). A class may be certified if it satisfies all four prerequisites of 23(a)-
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Rules of Civil Procedure2' and reorganizations under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code22 have been the tools most commonly used to
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation-and satisfies the
conditions of one of the four types of class actions under 23(b). See id. 23(b). Of these
four types of class actions, two are of particular relevance in resolving mass torts: opt-out
classes under 23(b)(3), see infra note 21, and mandatory classes under 23(b)(1)(B), see
infra note 26; see also Zipes, supra note 2, at 17-18 (noting that (b)(1)(B) and (b)(3) are
the most important class action provisions for mass torts).
Going beyond the text of Rule 23, an additional wrinkle to class certification has
emerged in recent years: class certification for settlement only. See In re Bendectin Prods.
Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305 n.10 (6th Cir. 1984) (tracing the precedent for settlement-
only classes back to a 1979 Fifth Circuit case, In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607
F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979)); infra note 87 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme
Court's recent approval of settlement classes). Settlement-only classes owe their existence
to two realities: defendants want to be able to negotiate class settlements without risking a
"bet-the-company" trial if negotiations break down, and judges want to be able to approve
a class settlement even if the class would be too unwieldy to go to trial.
When settlement is used to resolve a class action, the district court must go
beyond the class certification analysis to find that the terms of the settlement are fair; this
fairness inquiry is derived from 23(e)'s requirement of court approval before a case may
be dismissed. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e); see also 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.41, at 11-87 & n.222 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing the
23(e) fairness test); 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1797, at 340-41, 356-58 (2d ed. 1986) (same).
To summarize, all class actions must be certified by the court. Certification
demands that all of the prerequisites of 23(a) and one of the requirements of 23(b) be
satisfied. If the parties are seeking approval of a class settlement, the court also must find
that the settlement terms are fair.
21. Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out classes are those in which absent class members have the
right to choose to exclude themselves from the class, even after the class is certified. Such
self-exclusion typically is done in order to pursue individual litigation. Classes without an
express opt-out right are known as "mandatory classes." The opt-out class has been used
widely to aggregate mass tort claims because it is the broadest of the class action
provisions, allowing class certification in circumstances not permitted by the other Rule 23
provisions. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note. Opt-out classes may be
certified if, in addition to the general 23(a) prerequisites, see supra note 20, questions
common to the class predominate over uncommon questions, and class treatment is
superior to other means of adjudication. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
22. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1994). Many of the largest individual mass tort
defendants have resorted to bankruptcy reorganization. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co.,
880 F.2d 694, 697 (4th Cir. 1989) (involving the bankruptcy of a corporation valued at over
$2 billion triggered by litigation over its manufacture of the Dalkon Shield); In re Dow
Coming Corp., 237 B.R 380,384 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (involving the bankruptcy of a
multi-billion dollar corporation resulting from litigation over its manufacture of silicone
breast implants); see also infra note 44 (listing nine major asbestos manufacturers who
have declared bankruptcy). For general background on the bankruptcy reorganization
process, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THm ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 55-75, 230-54 (1992)
(describing Chapter 11); 7 WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1100.01, at 1100-3 to -6 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1999) (summarizing the core
policies of bankruptcy reorganization); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 846, 850-56 (1984) (describing the basic principles of bankruptcy and
their application in mass tort cases).
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aggregate mass tort claimsI but from the perspective of a defendant
seeking a global solution that will allow it to continue its business,
both have serious limitations.24 As a result, in recent years25 such
defendants have turned to a third option, the limited fund class action
settlement,26 a mandatory settlement from which claimants have no
express right to opt out
23. Many other aggregative options exist, but "each has been found wanting, whether
in efficiency, legitimacy or both." Cohen, supra note 19, at 274 (listing multidistrict
consolidation, Rule 42 consolidation, specialized courts, private case management
consortia, collateral estoppel, docket control, lobbying and legislative efforts, and
specialized trial structures); see also 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 15-26 (discussing
various aggregation options); WEINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 23-32 (same).
24. Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out classes are unappealing to defendants seeking total peace
for two primary reasons. First, they allow class members to opt out, thus unpredictably
increasing total liability. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 1382; Ralph R. Mabey & Peter
A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The Unfinished Business Left by the
Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. LJ. 487, 506 (1995). Second, they have become
more difficult to implement in light of recent case law. See, e.g., 1999 Report, supra note 6,
at 41; Alex Raskolnikov, Note, Is There a Future for Future Claimants After Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor?, 107 YALE LJ. 2545, 2561 (1998). Bankruptcy, meanwhile, is
unappealing to defendants primarily because plaintiffs may emerge in control of the
company. See, eg., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(detailing a bankruptcy plan pursuant to which tort claimants took control of the
reorganized company).
25. See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 805, 820
n.45 (1997) (noting that, from 1986 to 1990, only six class actions were certified under Rule
23(b)(1)(B)).
26. A limited fund exists when several parties hold claims against a single fund, and
the sum of the claims exceeds the value of the fund available. See Limited-Fund Classes,
in MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 4, app. F-9 at 1-2 (defining "limited fund"). For
example, a limited fund would exist in a case in which a bus crash injures 100 people,
causing $10,000 in injuries to each one for a total of $1,000,000 in claims, and the only asset
available to compensate them is a $500,000 insurance policy. Limited fund cases are
certifiable as class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), see FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory
committee's note, although the text of (b)(1)(B) does npt limit its use to limited fund
situations, see infra note 175 (discussing use of (b)(1)(B) in non-limited fund cases). To be
certified under (b)(1)(B), a class must satisfy the general prerequisites established in 23(a).
See supra note 20. In addition, the class must show that individual litigation of the claims
would risk "adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests."
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). To return to the bus crash example above, individual
litigation would mean that the first 50 claimants get a full recovery, while the last 50 get
nothing. In such a situation, individual litigation plainly would risk impairment of the
ability of some class members to protect their interests.
27. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan I"), 134 F.3d 668,669-
70 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (reaffirming a limited fund settlement class certification),
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999); Keene
Corp. v. Fiorelli (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 14 F.3d 726, 733 (2d Cir. 1993)
(reversing a limited fund settlement class certification); Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E.
& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d 721, 750-51 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing a limited fund
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Lower federal courts struggled for over a decade to assess the
appropriateness of the various mass tort aggregation options, until the
Supreme Court finally agreed to hear its first mass tort case in 19978
settlement class certification), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); In re A.H. Robins Co.,
880 F.2d 709,710 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming a limited fund settlement class certification); In
re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305-07 (6th Cir. 1984) (granting mandamus
and vacating a limited fund settlement class certification); Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re
N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.), 693 F.2d 847, 857 (9th Cir. 1982)
(reversing a limited fund settlement class certification); Wish v. Interneuron Pharms., Inc.
(In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. MDL 1203, CIV. A. 98-20594, 1999 WL 782560,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept 27, 1999) (rejecting a limited fund settlement class certification); In re
Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 187 F.R.D. 549, 555 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (rejecting certification
under 23(b)(1)(B), but approving it under 23(b)(2)); In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc.,
186 F.R.D. 459, 462 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (certifying a limited fund settlement class); Fanning
v. AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158, 165
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (certifying a limited fund settlement class); Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
175 F.R.D. 226, 233 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (rejecting a limited fund settlement class); In re
Rio Hair Naturalizer Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1055, 1996 WL 780512, at *21 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 20, 1996) (certifying a limited fund settlement class); Butler v. Mentor Corp.
(In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. CV 92-P-10000-S, at 3-4 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 10, 1993) (approving and certifying the Mentor settlement class and granting
final judgment as to claims against Mentor).
28. See Peter A. Drucker, Class Certification and Mass Torts: Are "Immature" Tort
Claims Appropriate for Class Action Treatment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 213, 213 (1998)
(noting that, until Amchem, the Supreme Court never had heard a mass tort case). Cases
that the Supreme Court declined to hear include In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Product Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1995) (side-
mounted fuel tanks class action), cert. denied sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. French,
516 U.S. 824 (1995), In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1995)
(HIV-tainted blood class action), cert. denied sub nom. Grady v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Inc., 516 U.S. 867 (1995), In re UNR Industries, 20 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 1994) (asbestos
bankruptcy), cert. denied sub nom. UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR
Indus., 513 U.S. 999 (1994), Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1282 (1990)
(consolidated asbestos cases), cert denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990), In re A.H. Robins Co., 880
F.2d at 710 (Dalkon Shield class action), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989), In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 1989)
(Dalkon Shield bankruptcy), cert. denied sub nom. Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co.,
493 U.S. 959 (1989), In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 145, 148
(2d Cir. 1987) (Agent Orange class action), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988), School
District of Lancaster v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec Ltd. (In re School Asbestos Litig.), 789
F.2d 996, 998 (3d Cir. 1986) (asbestos property damage class action), cert. denied sub nom.
Celotex Corp. v. School Dist. of Lancaster, 479 U.S. 852 (1986), and cert. denied sub nom.
National Gypsum Co. v. School Dist., 479 U.S. 915 (1986), and Abed, 693 F.2d at 848
(Dalkon Shield class action), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Abed, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983). Cf. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Trends and Developments in Mass Torts and
Class Actions in Year One of the Post-Amchem Era, SD15S ALI-ABA 77, 83 (1998),
available in WL, ALI-ABA database (noting that "the Supreme Court deigns to entertain
class-related matters only a few times each decade"); Francis E. McGovern, Judicial
Centralization and Devolution in Mass Torts, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 2077, 2077 (1997) (book
review) (noting the rarity of Supreme Court review of tort cases). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986), arose from an individual suit against an asbestos manufacturer.
The question before the Court involved general standards for summary judgment,
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In that case, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,29 the Court sharply
circumscribed the use of opt-out classes in mass tort litigation 0 Last
term, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.," the Court turned its attention to
the other significant mass tort class action tool, the limited fund
settlement class. In Ortiz, a decision already described as
"monumentally important for class action jurisprudence and the
future of settlement classes, 32 the Court rejected a limited fund
settlement arising out of asbestos litigation.3 In so doing, the Court
has cast doubt upon future mass tort limited fund settlements,
stopping just short of barring such settlements altogether.'
This Note begins by detailing the facts of Ortiz and summarizing
its disposition by the Supreme Court.35 It then assesses the continuing
availability of the limited fund settlement as a tool for resolving mass
tort claims? 6 Looking beyond the announced holding to the practical
impact of the Court's opinion, this Note concludes that the limited
fund settlement in its present form essentially has been foreclosed.
This foreclosure becomes evident upon examination of the Court's
treatment of the role of settlement in class certification,37 the types of
intra-class conflicts that require creation of subclasses,3" and a host of
serious questions raised and left unresolved in Ortiz.39 This Note next
explores questions likely to emerge in post-Ortiz limited fund
however, so it cannot be considered a mass tort case.
29. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
30. See id. at 612 (holding that a proposed class action designed to reach a global
settlement of current and future asbestos claims failed to meet the requirements of Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also supra note 24 (noting that Amchem
made opt-out classes more difficult to certify); infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text
(discussing Amchem).
31. 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
32. Linda S. Mullenix, Court Nixes Latest Settlement Class, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 16, 1999,
at B12. Professor Mullenix, author of LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS (1996), predicted that Ortiz "will immediately be cycled into the
casebooks." Mullenix, supra, at B12. The significance of Ortiz was apparent long before
the Court handed down its decision. See, e.g., Flanagan II, 134 F.3d at 670 (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (describing the case as "immensely important"). For contemporary media
analysis of the Ortiz opinion, see Mullenix, supra, at B12; Sharon Walsh, High Court
Overturns Asbestos Settlement; Ruling Limits Firms' Options in Class Actions, WASH.
POST, June 24,1999, at Al; Henry Weinstein, Supreme Court Voids Settlement in Asbestos
Suit, L.A. TIMES, June 24,1999, at Al.
33. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2323; see also infra notes 91-123 (discussing the Court's
disposition of the case).
34. See infra notes 132-74 (discussing the impact of Ortiz).
35. See infra notes 44-131 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 132-74 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 139-51 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 152-66 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
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settlement class litigation, considering the implications of the Court's
opinion viewed from the cutting edge of limited fund jurisprudence in
the lower federal courts.4° The discussion examines one form of
limited fund settlement that Ortiz unfortunately may encourage-the
no-allocation settlementl-and another form that Ortiz
unfortunately may prohibit-the going concern settlement. 2  The
Note closes with a closer look at the question of whether defendants
should be permitted to capture the transactional savings made
available by a limited fund settlement.
By 1990, asbestos litigation already had forced many of the
wealthiest asbestos producing companies into bankruptcy.'
Fibreboard had survived to that point at least in part because it was a
relatively minor player, both in terms of its asbestos market share and
in terms of its corporate wealth4 But as the volume of claims rose
and the number of other defendants shrank, time was decidedly not
on Fibreboard's side.46
The only hope for the company was a pair of insurance policies
40. See infra notes 175-250 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 176-210 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 211-35 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 236-50 and accompanying text.
44. See Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 509 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (listing the
bankruptcies of Unarco Industries, Johns-Manville, Inc., Celotex Corporation, Eagle-
Picher Industries, Inc., H.K. Porter Company, Inc., Keene Corporation, National Gypsum
Company, Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., and Raymark Industries, Inc.), affid sub nom.
Flanagan v. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114
(1997), reaffdper curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999); see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 1386 (noting
that 11 of the 25 major asbestos manufacturers had filed for bankruptcy by 1991).
45. See JAY TIDMARSH, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS
ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES 59 (1998). Although Fibreboard was primarily a timber
company, it produced asbestos from 1920 to 1971. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2303. During
much of that period, it was a wholly owned subsidiary of Louisiana Pacific Corporation,
which spun it off in 1988. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1399-1400. In 1995, Fibreboard was
valued by a federal district court at $235 million. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 529. But see
Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2317 n.28 (noting that Fibreboard was acquired in 1997 for $600 million
in cash and assumed debt). By comparison, the largest asbestos company, Johns-Manville,
had over $2.25 billion in assets. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710,
751 (E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y., & Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated and remanded, 982 F.2d 721,
739 (2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
Although Fibreboard has been a relatively minor defendant in asbestos litigation,
it was the named defendant in the case generally acknowledged to have opened the
floodgates for asbestos litigation. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 13, at 1003
(discussing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1092 (5th Cir. 1973),
which held that asbestos product manufacturers could be held strictly liable for injuries
resulting from asbestos exposure).
46. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1400 (noting Fibreboard's urgency to achieve a global
settlement, given that its unpaid commitments exceeded $1 billion).
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that Fibreboard had taken out for a few years in the 1950s.47
Fibreboard maintained that these policies provided virtually
unlimited coverage for all asbestos claims that preceded policy
expiration, and after a massive four-year trial, a California state court
agreed.' While the insurers appealed, the fate of all concerned hung
in the balance.4 9 If the insurers lost, they faced billions of dollars in
liability. If Fibreboard lost, it faced certain bankruptcy, while the
asbestos victims' prospects for meaningful recovery would
evaporate 5
With such astronomical stakes, Fibreboard decided that the time
was ripe to negotiate a class action settlement with both victims and
insurers. 2 The insurers demanded that any settlement bring total
peace,5 3 including resolution of all future claims; accordingly,
negotiations focused on mandatory class settlement 4  These
negotiations eventually produced three separate agreements: the
inventory settlement, the global settlement, and the trilateral
settlement5
47. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2303. Continental Casualty Company and Pacific
Indemnity Company issued the insurance policies. See id. The Continental policy was in
effect from 1957 to 1959, and the Pacific policy was in effect from 1956 to 1957. See id.
Both were comprehensive general liability insurance policies with per occurrence limits,
but with no overall cap on how much the insurers would pay out under the policies. See id.
Fibreboard did not argue that claims resulting from exposure after the 1959 expiration of
the insurance policies were indemnified. See id. Thus, in 1993, claims alleging pre-1959
exposure settled for an average of $12,000, while post-1959 asbestos exposure claims
settled for only $4000. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan I"), 90
F.3d 963, 1013 n.49 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S.
1114 (1997), reaffd per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
48. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2303. This coverage litigation was described later as a
"death struggle." United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *29, Ortiz (No. 97-
1704), available in 1998 WL 849388 (oral argument of Elihu Inselbuch on behalf of
settlement proponents). It was "one of the largest and most complex proceedings in the
history of American civil jurisprudence." Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 511.
49. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 971.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 970-71.
53. As the term is used generally, a global peace resolution includes all possible
claimants, including future claimants, and all possible defendants, including parent
corporations and insurers. See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv.
79, 127-29 (1997) (describing total peace resolutions generally and the Dalkon Shield
bankruptcy specifically).
54. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2304.
55. See Flanagan 1, 90 F.3d at 971-73; see also TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 60-61
(describing the settlement negotiation history). Of these three settlements, only the global
settlement was before the Supreme Court in Ortiz.
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The inventory settlement, negotiated first, settled the claims of
victims who were represented personally by class counsel.56
Settlement values were higher than average, but full payment was
contingent on a subsequent resolution of future claims.5 7 The global
settlement came next.58 It proposed a mandatory class composed of
substantially all Fibreboard asbestos victims who had not yet filed
claims.5 9 This class was not divided into subclasses. 60 Class members
would bring their claims through a trust, funded by $1.525 billion
from the insurers and $10 million from Fibreboard; all but $500,000 of
Fibreboard's share came from other insurance.61  Finally, the day
after reaching the global settlement, the parties negotiated the
trilateral settlement.6 The trilateral settlement provided that, should
the global settlement fail to secure court approval, the insurers would
pay Fibreboard $2 billion for a complete settlement of their liability.63
56. See Flanagan 1, 90 F.3d at 971. Two of the four class counsel were partners in the
South Carolina firm Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole. The inventory
settlement resolved that firm's entire inventory of pending cases. See id. Interestingly,
Ness, Motley partners had also served as class counsel in the settlement struck down in
Amchem. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 599 (1997). Ortiz was
something of a grudge match in this respect, because Baron & Budd, the law firm
representing those class members challenging the Fibreboard settlement, was the same
firm that successfully challenged the Amchem settlement. See Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 615 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). The leaders of both firms were singled out as "tort kings"
in a 1999 article in U.S. News & World Report discussing the influence of elite trial lawyers
over the behavior of corporations and politicians. See Lavelle & Cannon, supra note 15, at
38.
57. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 971 n.3; id. at 1010-11 (Smith, J., dissenting). Such
arrangements have been identified by some commentators as a red flag suggesting
collusion, because they may suggest that class counsel has received a premium for its cases
in exchange for acting contrary to the interests of the class. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton,
Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction, 80
CORNELL L. REV 811, 825 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELLL. REv. 1045,1064 (1995).
58. The negotiating attorneys reached the settlement at a chance midnight meeting at
a coffee shop in Tyler, Texas. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 971.
59. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2305 & n.5.
60. See id. at 2308.
61. See id. at 2304.
62. See id.
63. See id. The Supreme Court understood this $2 billion figure to be consistent with
the insurers' absolute refusal to pay more through the trilateral settlement than they had
agreed to pay under the global settlement. See id. at 2322. The trilateral settlement
amount was higher because it covered more claimants; in addition to the global future
claimants, it resolved the insurers' liability as to all pending or reserved claims. See
Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 521 (E.D. Tex. 1995), affd sub nom.
Flanagan v. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114
(1997), reaffdper curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999). Due to the transaction costs associated with
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With the settlement negotiated by the lawyers, all that remained
was to secure court approval of the class and of the settlement
terms.64 Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed Aheam v. Fibreboard Corp.65
in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Texas before
Chief Judge Robert M. Parker, an innovative veteran of asbestos
litigation.6 Chief Judge Parker appointed a guardian ad litem to
report on the settlement's fairness67 and held an eight-day fairness
hearing, at which several objecting class members testified.68 The
objectors challenged the global settlement, alleging conflicts of
individual litigation, the trilateral settlement was expected to provide a smaller recovery
for claimants than they would have received under the global settlement. See Ahearn, 162
F.R.D. at 527.
64. See generally supra note 20 (discussing procedure for court approval of class
settlements).
65. 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Flanagan v. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963
(5th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaff'd per curiam, 134 F.3d
668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct.
2295 (1999).
66. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659, 660-67 (1989) [hereinafter McGovern, Mature Mass Torts] (detailing Chief Judge
Parker's history of procedural innovation in asbestos litigation); Francis E. McGovern,
Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1851,
1862 (1997) (describing Chief Judge Parker as "a staunch advocate of more radical
solutions to resolving asbestos cases"). Chief Judge Parker was one of the six judges on
the Judicial Conference Ad Hoe Committee on Asbestos Litigation. See 1991 REPORT,
supra note 2, at 39. While the Ahearn appeal was pending before the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, he was appointed to that court from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas. The Fifth Circuit panel that heard the appeal of Ahearn was thus in the
somewhat awkward position of reviewing a judge who had since become a colleague.
Indeed, they actually were reviewing the work of two colleagues, as then-Chief Judge
Parker had appointed Fifth Circuit Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham to serve as facilitator
during the Fibreboard settlement negotiations. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 515. In fact,
Judge Higginbotham had made the suggestion to negotiate the inventory and global
settlements separately. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2330 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also infra
note 111 and accompanying text (describing the Ortiz Court's holding that this procedure
was impermissible).
67. Professor Eric Green was the guardian ad litem. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re
Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan I"), 90 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded,
521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaffd per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999). This appointment was striking
because Professor Green, as a vocal supporter of class action settlement, by his own
account stood contrary to "the overwhelming majority of the scholarly community ... led
by the most highly respected scholars in their fields." Eric D. Green, What Will We Do
When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First
Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1787 (1997). On the other hand, one commentator
highlighted Chief Judge Parker's appointment of a guardian ad litem and his holding of
lengthy fairness hearings as a model of responsible judicial inquiry. See Howard M.
Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2003-04, 2009
(1999).
68. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2305-06.
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interest of class counsel resulting from the inventory settlement,69
inadequate procedural protections in light of conflicting interests
among class members,70 and the absence of a limited fund.71  Over
these objections, Chief Judge Parker certified the mandatory class
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and approved the settlement as "fair,
reasonable, and adequate." 72
The objectors in Aheam appealed to the Fifth Circuit,73 where a
divided panel affirmed.74 The majority noted that the fact of
settlement should be considered when deciding whether to certify a
class action.75 After concluding that there were no fatal conflicts
within the class or between the class and the inventory settlers, 76 the
court upheld certification of the mandatory class under a limited fund
theory.77 The majority held that Fibreboard's retention of most of its
assets was permissible because the class was receiving a larger
recovery as a result of the settlement.78
69. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 525; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text
(discussing the argument that lucrative inventory settlements are used to persuade class
counsel to reach a class settlement on terms that favor the defendant).
70. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 525.
71. See id. at 527. Without a limited fund, the objectors argued, certification of the
class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) was improper. See id. See generally supra note 26
(discussing the limited fund concept).
72. Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 528.
73. As inevitably happens in a settlement class action that is appealed, the party
structure (and thus the caption of the case) shifted on appeal. The original parties-
Gerald Ahearn, four other named plaintiffs, and the defendant-were united in defense of
the settlement, while James Flanagan, Esteban Yanez Ortiz, and other objectors stood in
opposition to the agreement. Thus, Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp. became Flanagan v.
Ahearn on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Finally, when Flanagan dropped out, the case
became Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. on appeal to the Supreme Court. See supra note 44
(citing the complete procedural history of the case).
74. Flanagan v. Aheam (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan I"), 90 F.3d 963, 968-93
(5th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaffd per curiam, 134 F.3d
668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct.
2295 (1999). Judge W. Eugene Davis wrote the panel's opinion. See id. Judge Jerry E.
Smith dissented. See id. at 993 (Smith, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 975. Chief Judge Parker had assumed that certification standards for
settlement classes and trial classes were the same. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 523. The
issue of relaxing certification standards for settlement classes is discussed infra at notes
139-51 and accompanying text.
76. See Flanagan 1, 90 F.3d at 978-82.
77. See id at 988.
78. See id. at 985. The court also rejected the objectors' other challenges. First, the
majority found that the Article III "case or controversy" requirement was satisfied. See id.
at 988. It also rejected the argument that Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797
(1985), recognized a due process right to opt out of even mandatory classes. See Flanagan
1, 90 F.3d at 986. The court noted that the holding in Shutts had been limited to cases
predominantly for money damages, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3, while a limited fund class action's
pro rata reduction of all claims made such actions equitable in nature. See Flanagan I, 90
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Dissenting "vehemently,"79 Judge Jerry E. Smith decried the
majority's approval of "the first no-opt-out, mass-tort, settlement-
only, futures-only class action ever attempted or approved.""0
Disagreeing with essentially all of the majority's holdings, he also
questioned the underlying justice of the settlement: "Fibreboard
hand-picked a class that was uniquely vulnerable to exploitation, class
counsel who were widely reported to have sold out a similar class, and
a court with a reputation for favoring a global settlement."'"
While appeal of the Fifth Circuit decision in Ahearn was
pending, the Supreme Court handed down Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor.8 The Court granted certiorari in the Fibreboard case and
immediately vacated and remanded it to the Fifth Circuit for
reconsideration in light of Amchem.8 '
Amchem, like Ortiz, involved a massive settlement of future
asbestos claims, but with one major procedural difference: Amchem
had been certified as a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class, not a limited fund
F.3d at 986. For more on due process opt-out rights, see Leslie W. O'Leary, Mass Tort
Class Actions: Will Amchem Spawn Creative Solutions?, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 469, 469-89
(1998). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 727 (1998)
(describing the Court's ill-fated efforts to reach the issue left open by Shutts regarding
whether due process requires opt-out rights in mandatory suits seeking equitable relief).
A distinct question that also has caused disagreement involves the discretion (rather than
the due process obligation) of trial judges to allow class members to opt out of mandatory
classes. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (joining the
Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in allowing discretion to permit opt-
out from a mandatory class); George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt
Out at the Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 272, 287 (1996)
(arguing against allowing mandatory class members to opt out); Steven T. 0. Cottreau,
Note, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 480, 481
(1998) (arguing for a "robust right to opt out" of mandatory classes).
79. Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 993 (Smith, J., dissenting). For example, Judge Smith
asked, "How could well-intentioned judges sanction-indeed, compel-such an untoward
result?" Id (Smith, J., dissenting). Later, he charged that "[e]ven rudimentary
constitutional protections ... would have prevented ... this unfortunate miscarriage of
justice." Id. at 995 (Smith, J., dissenting).
80. IdL at 993 (Smith, J., dissenting).
81. Id at 994 (Smith, J., dissenting). The "widely reported" class counsel sell-out
refers to Ness, Motley's representation of the plaintiff class that was ultimately rejected by
the Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997). See
Coffee, supra note 2, at 1397-99 (arguing that the Amchem class counsel acted
collusively); supra note 56.
82. 521 U.S. at 591. Amchem and its underlying facts have been analyzed thoroughly
by scholars. See, e.g., TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 25-31, 47-58; Koniak, supra note 57, at
1045-1138; O'Leary, supra note 78, at 469-89.
83. See Flanagan v. Ahear, 521 U.S. 1114, 1114 (1997) (granting certiorari and
vacating and remanding for further consideration in light of Amchem), reaffd per curiam,
134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119
S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
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(b)(1)(B) mandatory class.84 As a result, the degree to which the
Amchem holding applied to limited fund classes such as the one in the
Fibreboard settlement was uncertain. 5 Amchem's central, ambiguous
holding was that settlement should be considered by a court in
deciding whether to certify a settlement class, although such
consideration did not in all respects weigh in favor of the proposed
class.s Amchem also established that both settlement class actions
and mass tort class actions are permissible. 87
On remand, the Fifth Circuit took only five paragraphs to
distinguish Amchem and again affirm the settlement. 8 The court
stated that Amchem involved an opt-out class under 23(b)(3) that
allocated recoveries based on the type or severity of the injury, while
the present case was a 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class that treated all
claimants alike. 9 For the second time, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.90
In an opinion written by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit.91 The Court began by noting that the heart
84. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622. See generally supra notes 21, 26 (describing opt-out
and limited fund classes).
85. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan II"), 134 F.3d 668, 669-
70 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999); Cohen, supra note 19, at 286; Green, supra note 67, at 1778-79.
The Third Circuit's discussion in Amchem emphasized that its intent to rein in class action
practice analysis did not apply to limited fund classes. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods.,
Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997).
86. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619-21. This holding is discussed more thoroughly infra
at notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
87. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 618, 625. Both points had been in doubt. See, e.g., 7B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1783, at 76 (noting that "allowing a class action to be
brought in a mass tort situation is clearly contrary to the intent of the draftsmen of the
rule"); Note, Back to the Drawing Board The Settlement Class Action and the Limits of
Rule 23, 109 HARv. L. REv. 828, 830-31 (1996) (arguing that settlement classes are
forbidden by Rule 23).
88. See Flanagan 1, 134 F.3d at 669-70. Judge Smith again wrote in forceful dissent.
See id. at 683 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("The panel majority ... casually dismisses the
teaching of Amchem and blesses a class that falls far short of legal and constitutional
requirements.").
89. See id. at 669-70 (Smith, J., dissenting).
90. 524 U.S. 936 (1998).
91. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2323. Justice Souter's opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg. See id. at
2302. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a brief concurrence, in which Justices Scalia and
Kennedy joined. See id. at 2323-24 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Breyer dissented,
joined by Justice Stevens. See id. at 2324-33 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For media reaction
to the decision, see supra note 32 (listing articles). Because the trilateral settlement was
not appealed to the Supreme Court, it is final, and the money that Fibreboard received is
available to pay individual claims. See Weinstein, supra note 32, at A22.
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of the case was "the conditions for certifying a mandatory settlement
class on a limited fund theory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(1)(B)." The language of the Rule itself is quite broad;93 the
Court concluded that if the only hurdles to the certification of limited
fund settlement classes were those imposed by the text, then
(b)(1)(B) might well be used in ways that violated the Rules Enabling
Act,94 the Seventh Amendment,95 and constitutional due process." In
need of a limiting construction of (b)(1)(B),9 the Court explored the
history of limited fund class action cases from the vantage point of the
drafters of the 1966 amendment that codified modem Rule 23(b). 98
Distilling these cases to their essence, the Court developed a limited
fund class action "historical model."99 According to the Court, the
historical model of limited fund class actions is composed of three
elements: inadequacy of the fund, equity among members of the
class, and exhaustion of the fund."° The Court held that in a limited
92. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2302; see also supra note 26 (quoting the text of Rule
23(b)(1)(B)).
93. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2312-13; see also supra note 21 (discussing Rule 23(b)(3)).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right"); see Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (stating that "[i]n suits at common law ... the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved"); see Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); see Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
97. The lower courts took a different approach. Chief Judge Parker opted for a "plain
meaning" interpretation of Rule 23(b)(1)(B). See Abeam v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D.
505, 526 (E.D. Tex. 1995), affd sub nom. Flanagan v. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996),
vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaffd per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir.
1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
The Fifth Circuit followed his lead. See Flanagan v. Abeam (In re Asbestos Litig.)
("Flanagan I"), 90 F.3d 963, 983 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114
(1997), reaffdper curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
98. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2308-10. Professor Mullenix described the Court's analysis
as "parsimonious and constipated." Mullenix, supra note 32, at B12. The Advisory
Committee notes accompanying amended Rule 23 state that mass torts arising from
accidents such as plane crashes are "ordinarily not appropriate for a class action." FED. R.
Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note. The Committee did not even contemplate the use
of mandatory classes under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in such cases. See 1999 Report, supra note 6,
at 38. Nor did it anticipate use of any provision of Rule 23 to resolve any mass torts that,
like asbestos, did not arise from a single accident. See id. See generally Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 1849 (1998) (describing the historical evolution of class litigation); Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967) (discussing the 1966 amendments in an
article written by the reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules).
99. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2300.
100. See id. at 2311-12.
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fund settlement class action, fund inadequacy and class equity are
required, and fund exhaustion is at least presumptively necessary.1 1
Applying the historical model to the settlement class before it, the
Court concluded that none of the three elements was satisfied.
To show inadequacy, the Court stated, it is not enough that the
settling parties agree that the fund is limited to a particular amount.'12
The parties to the settlement must present evidence-and the trial
judge must make specific findings of fact-establishing with sufficient
precision'03 both the value of the available fund and its insufficiency
to satisfy all claims.104 In the Fibreboard settlement, the fund
consisted of the defendant's assets plus its available insurance
101. See id. at 2312 (stating that all three elements of the historical model are
presumptively necessary); id. at 2321 (declining to reach the question of whether
exhaustion is a required element); id. at 2323 (holding that inadequacy and equity are
required). The Court's careful reservation of the question of whether exhaustion is an
absolute requirement has been overlooked by two early Ortiz interpreters. See Cullen v.
Whitman Med. Corp., 188 F.R.D. 226,236 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating that all three elements
of the Ortiz historical model are required); The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Leading
Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 200,309-10 (1999) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (same).
Similarly, a state court has apparently already concluded that non-exhaustion
alone is a sufficient basis for rejecting a limited fund settlement. See Schmitt, supra note
12, at B6. The court valued the settlement at $75 million and the defendant at $200
million, and as a result, "'this court cannot and does not find that the exhaustion
requirement identified in Ortiz has been met.' "Id. (quoting Alabama Circuit Court Judge
Robert Kendall).
102. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2316.
103. See id. (noting the requirement of "a sufficiently reliable determination of the
probable total"); see also infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing the
implications of the requirement of precise valuation of claims); infra notes 211-35 and
accompanying text (discussing the implications of the requirement of precise valuation of
defendant).
104. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2316-17. The Court further requires that the trial judge's
factual findings follow a hearing in which the settling parties' evidence is subject to
challenge. See iL The Court implicitly acknowledged that even the protections it
required might be inadequate; it observed that, after presentation of evidence and findings
of fact, the district court valued Fibreboard at $235 million, yet it was sold shortly
afterward for $600 million. See id. at 2317 n.28; see also Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a
Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 12, on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(noting the difficulty of valuing the assets and liabilities of a large corporate defendant).
Another recent limited fund class settlement case illustrates even more vividly
concerns about the effectiveness of the Court's inadequacy standard. In Fanning v.
AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158 (E.D.
Pa. 1997), the settling parties valued the limited fund (the defendant company) at $104
million. See id. at 168. After hearing expert testimony from the settlement proponents,
the trial court accepted this valuation. See id. at 170. Around the same time that all
appeals to the settlement were dropped, the defendant was purchased for $325 million.
See S. Elizabeth Gibson, Mass Torts Limited Fund & Bankruptcy Reorganization
Settlements: Four Case Studies, in MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 4, app. E at 70
(1999).
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coverage. 05  The Court held that the district court erred by
uncritically accepting the parties' negotiated valuation of that fund."°6
With titanic attorneys' fees riding on the class counsels' willingness to
reach a settlement, the class members could not have relied upon
counsel to have negotiated a maximized value.1°
7
Equity within the class, the second element of the Court's
historical model, encompasses two distinct inquiries: inclusiveness of
the class and fairness of the fund distribution. The former asks how
far the "natural class,"' 0 --that is, "everyone who might state a claim
on a single or repeated set of facts, invoking a common theory of
recovery,"' ° -has been reduced by prior dispositions to form the
settlement class." 0 The settlement class here failed because class
counsel agreed to exclude some 100,000 present claimants, roughly a
third of the natural class, many of whom counsel represented
directly."' The Court left open the possibility that such class
105. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2317. Of course, if Fibreboard won the coverage litigation,
the fund would have been limited only by the assets of the insurance companies. The
Court here assumed without deciding that a limited fund could be established by "a value
discounted by risk," the more or less unlimited value of the insurance fund discounted by
the risk that the insurers would prevail in the coverage litigation. Id
106. See iL at 2316.
107. See id. at 2317-18; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 1401 & n.227 (estimating
attorneys' fees for the inventory settlement to be $167 million).
108. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2319.
109. Id. at 2311.
110. See id. Reduction of the natural class occurs when the definition of the class is
drawn to exclude natural class members. Such exclusions are apt to be particularly
invidious when all present claimants are gerrymandered out of the class, because present
claimants are more likely to monitor the performance of class counsel. See Flanagan v.
Abeam (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan I"), 90 F.3d 963, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1996)
(Smith, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaffd per curiam, 134
F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S.
Ct. 2295 (1999).
One post-Ortiz federal court has announced that any proposed limited fund class
(including the non-settlement class before it) that does not include all potential class
members cannot be certified. See Cullen v. Whitman Med. Corp., 188 F.R.D. 226, 236-37
(E.D. Pa. 1999) ("I decline to certify the class under 23(b)(1)(B) because the putative class
members do not include all potential claimants." (citing School Dist. of Lancaster v. Lake
Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd. (In re School Asbestos Litig.), 789 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d. Cir
1986))). This holding, which did not cite Ortiz as authority for the court's conclusion,
substantially extends the Ortiz "natural class" idea. In Ortiz, the Court stated that "[i]t is a
fair question how far a natural class may be depleted by prior dispositions of claims and
still qualify as a mandatory limited fund class." 119 S. Ct. at 2319 (emphasis added). The
Cullen court's requirement that all natural class members be included in all limited fund
classes goes beyond each of the italicized phrases.
111. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2318-19. The Court noted that excluded natural class
claims (that is, other Fibreboard asbestos injury claims) included 45,000 settled present
claims, an estimated 53,000 unsettled present claims, and an uncertain number of reserved
claims, leaving an estimated 186,000 future claims in the class. See id.
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exclusions might be acceptable if all natural class members received
demonstrably comparable benefits, but it concluded that in this case
the class members fared worse than the settled inventory claims.112
On the second equity issue, fairness of the fund distribution, the
Court held the settlement to be deficient."' When a settlement class
covers both unliquidated present claims and unaccrued future claims,
the fairness element requires, at a minimum, the procedural
protection of separately represented subclasses to address class
members' conflicting interests."4 The Court held that the district
court erred in failing to appoint subclasses to address two sets of
conflicts within the class: those between present and future claimants
and those between pre- and post-1959 claimants.115 Neither the
provision of equal allocation to such disparate claimants"6 nor the
urgency of their collective interest in securing a settlement of the
coverage litigation"17 could obviate the need for procedural
protections."'
Finally, the Court found the settlement plainly at odds with the
third element of the limited fund historical model, fund exhaustion."'
Far from devoting the entire fund to the claims,' Fibreboard
retained all but $500,000 of its net worth.' Although it did not reach
the question of whether such an arrangement alone would be
112. See id at 2319.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 2319-20. The Court acknowledged that "at some point there must be an
end to reclassification with separate counsel, [but that] these two instances of conflict are
well within the requirement of structural protection." I& at 2320. Recall that pre-1959
claims arguably were covered by substantial insurance, while those arising after 1959 were
not. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
116. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320. But see infra note 195 (explaining that the
Fibreboard settlement did not involve equal allocations).
117. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320 ("Rule 23 requires protections under subdivisions (a)
and (b) against inequity and potential inequity at the pre-certification stage, quite
independently of the required determination at postcertification fairness review under
subdivision (e) that any settlement is fair in an overriding sense.").
118. See id.
119. See id. at 2321.
120. See id.
121. For examples of dubious non-exhaustion limited fund settlements approved
before Ortiz, see In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Ina, 186 F.R.D. 459, 462 (S.D. Ohio
1999) (approving a limited settlement that released class members' claims against three
companies, only one of whose assets were used to determine the limits of the fund), and In
re Rio Hair Naturalizer Products Liability Litigation, No. MDL 1055, 1996 WL 780512, at
*21 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 1996) (approving a limited fund settlement that required
payment of only 75% of available insurance and no contribution from the defendant
corporation, while plaintiffs' counsel received 20% of the fund in fees).
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sufficient to defeat approval of a mandatory class action settlement,'2
the Court did note that it "seem[ed] irreconcilable" with mandatory
treatment.'2
In his two-paragraph concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist
pointedly underlined the majority's call' 24 for a congressional solution
to asbestos litigation.15 He noted that "the 'elephantine mass of
asbestos cases' cries out for a legislative solution."'"
122. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2321; see also supra note 101 (noting that the Court did not
hold that exhaustion is required).
123. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2331.
124. See id. at 2302 & n.1.
125. See id. at 2324 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
126. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2302). The Amchem Court made
a similar plea for a legislative response to the asbestos crisis. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997). Many unsuccessful attempts have been made since the
late 1970s to address asbestos issues legislatively. See Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper
Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REv. 157, 163 n.28 (1998) (citing hearings on
four separate congressional bills); cf. Maria Gabriela Bianchini, Comment, The Tobacco
Agreement That Went up in Smoke: Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention into
Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87 CAL. L. REV. 703, 718-19 n.79 (1999) (citing five
congressional efforts to legislate general mass tort reform since 1992). After Amchem, six
asbestos defendants hired a lobbying firm to renew efforts to achieve a legislated solution,
see Erichson, supra note 67, at 2019, but threats of "'nuclear war' " from plaintiffs'
lawyers convinced all but one to withdraw their support. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Now on
Video: America's Scariest Special Interest, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1999, at A23 (quoting
attorney Joseph F. Rice). Nonetheless, in March 1999, the Fairness in Asbestos
Compensation Act of 1999 was introduced in both the House and the Senate to create an
Asbestos Resolution Corporation to resolve all claims. See S. 758, 106th Cong. (1999)
(Sup. Does. No. Y 1.4/1.106-1-758); H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. (1999) (Sup. Does. No.
Y 1.4/6:106-1-1283); see also Michael Barone, Money Talks, as It Should, U.S. NEVS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 15, 1999, at 37, 37 (supporting and describing the bill). This bill
generally is supported by business interests and is opposed by the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America and the AFL-CIO. See Congress Considers a New ADR Agency for
Asbestos Suits, 17 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LmGATION 137, 137 (CPR
Inst. for Dispute Resolution 1999). While several commentators have expressed
skepticism regarding the likelihood of congressional action, see Coffee, supra note 2, at
1463; Erichson, supra note 67, at 2019-20, 2024; Feinberg, supra note 19, at 365; Zipes,
supra note 2, at 9 & n.6; Raskolnikov, supra note 24, at 2546 & n.18, a House
subcommittee held hearings on the bill one week after Ortiz was decided. See Congress
Considers a New ADR Agency for Asbestos Suits, supra, at 138. The bill's sponsor pointed
to Ortiz as the latest stone in a " 'procedural wall' "preventing class resolution of asbestos
litigation. Id. (quoting Rep. Henry J. Hyde).
Congressional reluctance to intervene in the asbestos arena may be in part the
result of "harsh and sustained criticism from many quarters" of a similar foray into mass
compensation-the federal Black Lung program. Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An
Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 941, 969 (1995); see also 30
U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994) (creating the Black Lung program). Congress established a trust
for the compensation of afflicted coal miners in 1969, but by the time the law was
substantially amended in 1981, the trust was $1.4 billion in debt, with a projected debt of
$19.2 billion by 1995. See John S. Lopatto III, The Federal Black Lung Program: A 1983
Primer, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 677, 678 (1983). See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Worst
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In dissent, Justice Breyer 27 accepted the majority's limited fund
historical model as a basis for analysis, but argued that the settlement
substantially met each element.' 8 He argued that district courts
should aggressively seek out efficient ways to resolve asbestos
cases,129 while appellate courts should draw upon district courts'
greater experience with, and appreciation of, the problems posed by
mass tort litigation. In an asbestos settlement, he said, "I believe
our Court should allow a district court full authority to exercise every
bit of discretionary power that the law provides. ' 3
This Note has suggested that the fundamental question in the
Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
541, 552 n.46 (1992) (citing studies reviewing the Black Lung program).
A recent comment analyzes the $368.5 billion tobacco settlement negotiated by
the tobacco industry and 40 state attorneys general that Congress rejected in 1998. See
Bianchini, supra, at 705. The author observed that the settlement negotiators essentially
had agreed to a mass tort class action settlement that they had submitted to Congress
rather than to a court. See id. The settlement likely would have run afoul of Rule 23 had
the negotiators chosen to file the settlement in court as a class action, the author
determined, see id. at 726-35, but if Congress had passed the settlement as legislation it
would have survived any subsequent legal challenge, see id. at 735-43. The author
concluded that Congress, and not the judiciary, is in a position to resolve mass tort
litigation efficiently, but cautioned that a legislative solution heightens the dangers of
collusion and special interest influence. See id. at 748-50.
127. An interesting aspect of recent mass tort jurisprudence is the extent to which the
cases have divided otherwise like-thinking judges. See McGovern, supra note 13, at 596.
In the Supreme Court, the schism has divided the liberal end of the court, with Justices
Souter and Ginsburg writing the majority opinions in Ortiz and Amchem and Justices
Stevens and Breyer dissenting. In the Fifth Circuit, the battle raged in Flanagan I and 1I
between Judges Davis and Smith, both conservative judges. See Fifth Circuit, 2 ALMANAC
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6, 18-19 (Megan Chase ed., 1998). Professor McGovern
discusses various explanations for this phenomenon in an article written before Amchem
was handed down. See McGovern, supra note 13, at 595-97, 602-14.
128. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2332 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 2325 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
130. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer quoted Chief Judge Parker's
opinion in Cimino v. Raymark Industries in lamenting" 'a disparity of appreciation for the
magnitude of the problem.'" Id (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Cimino v. Raymark
Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd and remanded in part, vacated and
remanded in part, rev'd and rendered in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also In re
A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 734 & n.32 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting criticism of appellate
courts for failing to recognize and respond to the problems posed by mass torts). But see
Coffee, supra note 2, at 1463 (arguing that such detachment is a virtue because it insulates
appellate judges from the ethical conflicts resulting from a trial judge's desire to avoid the
"mind-numbing tedium" of massive numbers of monotonous asbestos cases).
131. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2325 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Noting that
"[tlhe judiciary cannot treat the problem as entirely one of legislative failure, as if it were
caused, say, by a poorly drafted statute," Justice Breyer suggested that "when 'calls for
national legislation' go unanswered, judges can and should search aggressively for ways,
within the framework of existing law, to avoid delay and expense so great as to bring
about a massive denial of justice." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2302).
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evolution of mass tort law asks which tool or tools may be used to
resolve mass tort claims.132 Before Ortiz, the limited fund mandatory
settlement class action was one of the primary choices. The essential
question, then, is whether limited fund settlement classes survive
Ortiz.
On a formal level, at least, Ortiz provides no definitive answer to
that question. No fewer than three times, the Court raised, without
resolving, the "ultimate question" of whether Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
settlement classes ever may be used to aggregate tort claims.133 It
might be noted as a preliminary matter that the fact that the Court
posed the question so insistently hardly suggests sympathy with those
who advocate mandatory settlement classes for mass tort resolution.
At a minimum, the Court has created a new level of uncertainty for
mass tort litigants; before Ortiz, no federal court had held, or indeed
even seriously considered, the possibility that limited fund classes
were off limits to mass tort litigants."34
Going beyond the Court's formal holdings sheds further light on
the continuing viability of the mandatory mass tort settlement class.
132. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
133. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2312, 2314; see also id. at 2323 (raising the issue without calling
it the "ultimate question"). The subtle differences among the iterations of the question
bear noting. One poses "the ultimate question whether settlements of multitudes of
related tort actions are amenable to mandatory class treatment." Id. at 2312. Another
asks if Rule 23(b)(1)(B) can ever be used in a plan that resolves both present and future
claims. See id. at 2323. In its broadest formulation, the Court poses "the ultimate question
whether Rule 23(b)(1)(B) may ever be used to aggregate individual tort claims." Id at
2314.
134. See, e.g., Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d
721, 739 (2d Cir. 1992) (vacating the certification of a mass tort limited fund class, but
noting that such a class would have been permissible with proper subclasses), modified,
993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon
Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.), 693 F.2d 847, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1982) (decertifying a mass
tort limited fund class, but leaving open the possibility that such classes could be certified).
The only reported decision that even approaches saying that (b)(1)(B) is unavailable in
mass tort cases is Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226, 233 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
In that case, the court rejected a limited fund settlement class composed of tens of millions
of smoking victims, a class "so uniquely expansive" that it "appear[ed] to defy" necessary
division into subclasses. Id. at 232-33. Such language, of course, is far from holding that
limited fund resolution of mass torts is per se forbidden. Likewise, commentators have
not argued for such a rule. But cf Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 809-11, 832 (arguing that
Rule 23(b)(1) should be eliminated and that in the meantime proposed (b)(1) classes-
mass tort and otherise-should face a strong presumption against certification); Richard
L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CoRNELL L.
REv. 858, 877-88 (1995) (arguing that limited fund classes should be available rarely, if
ever, in mass torts). Indeed, it appears that the suggestion that (b)(1)(B) would be
unavailable to mass tort litigants specifically only arose during oral argument of Ortiz. See
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *9, Ortiz (No. 97-1704), available in
1998 WL 849388 (oral argument of Laurence H. Tribe on behalf of settlement objectors).
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A close reading of Ortiz strongly suggests that this issue, ostensibly
unresolved by the Court, has been decided for all practical
purposes.135 To see how, it is useful to look closely at three aspects of
the opinion that the Court itself did not emphasize, but that, when
viewed in light of existing case law, send an unmistakably negative
message to those considering mass limited fund settlements in the
future. First, Ortiz resolved an ambiguity in the case law regarding
whether the fact of settlement should weigh for or against
certification, holding that limited fund classes demand more scrutiny
when certification is for settlement only. 36  Second, the Court
declined the obvious opportunity to endorse the consensus
developing among lower courts that subclasses are required only
when the conflicts within a class are substantial.3 7 Finally, Ortiz left
several crucial issues unresolved, creating a level of uncertainty sure
to be discouraging to those considering negotiating a major limited
fund settlement.3 ' Taken together, these three aspects of Ortiz will
force litigants to look elsewhere for a means to aggregate and resolve
mass tort claims.
The most fundamental way that the Court can influence the
viability of the limited fund settlement is by changing the standard of
scrutiny applied to such settlements' certification. Heightened
scrutiny of settlement classes obviously would make limited fund
classes more difficult to certify, while a more deferential standard
would encourage their use. The Court granted certiorari to hear
Amchem in 1997 precisely to resolve a split among courts regarding
whether the fact of settlement could itself be a factor weighing in
favor of class certification.139 As it happened, however, Amchem only
135. See Steven Glickstein et al., Product Liability Class Actions, in NON-FEDERAL
QUESTION CLASS ACIONS: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE STRATEGY 1999, at 317, 340
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. Ho-0068, 1999) (arguing that
Ortiz "severely restricted, if not entirely eliminated, the use of 'limited fund' class actions
in mass torts by imposing [the historical model]"); see also Richard B. Schmitt & Laura
Johannes, Judge Rejects Interneuron's Proposed Class-Action Settlement over Diet Pill,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1999, at B15 (quoting Arnold Levin, an attorney who helped
negotiate a limited fund settlement rejected in light of Ortiz, as saying, "'I think the
weight of the Supreme Court decision was just too great to overcome' "). But see
Mullenix, supra note 32, at B12 (predicting that "[l]awyers are not going to give up on
limited-fund settlement classes after Ortiz," but also stating that "Justice Souter single-
handedly rendered the class action rule a quaint museum piece").
136. See infra notes 139-51 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 152-66 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
139. See Cramton, supra note 57, at 824 (noting the openness of the question).
Compare In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he promotion
of settlement may well be a factor in resolving the issue of certification .... If not a
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muddied the waters.
I Amchem expressly rejected the Third Circuit's holding that
settlement classes must be held to the same certification standard as
litigation classes, noting that "settlement is relevant to a class
certification" and that "settlement is a factor in the calculus.""14 The
Court specifically held that, in a proposed opt-out class, the court
need not weigh trial manageability as a factor in its certification
decision.' 4' Taken in isolation, such language seems to hold
settlement classes to a lower standard than trial classes. Yet,
Amchem went on to hold that "other" provisions of Rule 23--"those
designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad
class definitions-demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in
the settlement context."'4 This language, again read in isolation,
seemed to go beyond the Third Circuit's holding by setting higher
standards for settlement classes, at least as to certain unidentified
provisions of Rule 23. In a footnote, the Court explained rather
mysteriously that "[s]ettlement, though a relevant factor, does not
inevitably signal that class action certification should be granted more
readily than it would were the case to be litigated.... [P]roposed
settlement classes sometimes warrant more, not less caution on the
question of certification."'' 4
Such mixed signals on the central holding of the case 44
ground for certification per se, certainly settlement should be a factor, and an important
factor, to be considered when determining certification."), and 2 NEWBERG & CONTE,
supra note 20, § 11.28, at 11-57 (stating that "Rule 23 class requirements are more readily
satisfied in the settlement context"), with Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610,
625 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he rule in this circuit is that settlement class certification is not
permissible unless the case would have been 'triable in class form.' ") (citation omitted),
affid sub nor. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Professor
McGovern has suggested that adoption of the Third Circuit's view would have contributed
to the virtual elimination of the use of class actions in mass tort litigation. See McGovern,
supra note 13, at 603.
140. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619, 622.
141. See id. at 620 ("[A] district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would
present intractable management problems, see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D), for the
proposal is that there be no trial."). Rule 23(b)(3)(D) provides that, in certifying an opt-
out class, "[t]he matters pertinent to the findings [of predominance and superiority]
include: ... the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action."
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). Note that (b)(3)(D) is not relevant to the certification of a
mandatory class.
142. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620; see also id. at 620 n.16 ("For reasons the Third Circuit
aired, see 83 F.3d 610, 626-35 (1996), proposed settlement classes sometimes warrant
more, not less, caution on the question of certification.").
143. Id- at 620 n.16 (emphasis added).
144. See Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226, 230 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) ("The
precise question faced in Amchem was the role settlement may play under Rule 23 in
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predictably spawned confusion.145 Some courts and commentators
read Amchem to set a lower standard for settlement classes than trial
classes.Y6 Others concluded just the opposite, 47 with some courts
decertifying classes that they previously had granted preliminary
certification.' 48 Still others viewed the two standards as equal in all
respects but trial manageability.1 49
In Ortiz, the Court resolved the question of settlement's role in
certification firmly in favor of those who read Amchem to raise the
bar for settlement class actions, at least as to mandatory classes. 50
Without even referring to Amchem's holding that settlement is a
factor, the Ortiz Court transformed what originally served as a shield
judging the propriety of class certification.").
145. See TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 27 ("The difficult question.., is deciding exactly
which parts of Rule 23(a) and (b) can be de-emphasized in a settlement class action, and
which must be strictly complied with."); cf. Cabraser, supra note 28, at 84 (observing that
decisions after Amchem appear to use Amchem as authority to support whatever
decision-for or against certification-the court seems predisposed to make).
146. See San Antonio Hispanic Police Officers' Org., Inc., v. City of San Antonio, 188
F.R.D. 433, 441, 453 (W.D. Tex. 1999); In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 459,
472-76 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Fanning v. AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods.
Liab. Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 69
n.168 ("The Fifth Circuit [in Flanagan 1] ... noted (correctly in light of Amchem) that the
factor of settlement ... can be considered in deciding whether Rule 23's elements have
been met."); Cabraser, supra note 28, at 87 ("Amchem indicates that the fact of settlement
weighs strongly in favor of class certification .... "); Herbert E. Milstein & Gary E.
Mason, The Reaction to Class Action, NJ. LJ., Aug. 18, 1997, at S-12, S-12 ("National
settlements of [class action] cases may actually become more likely since the courts must
now expressly consider the settlement itself when deciding whether to certify the
settlement class.").
147. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998); Krell v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig.), 148
F.3d 283, 308 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
525 U.S. 1114 (1999); Barboza v. Ford Consumer Serv. Co., No. CIV. A. 94-12352-GAO,
1998 WL 148832, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 1998); Clement v. American Honda Fin. Corp.,
176 F.R.D. 15, 21 (D. Conn. 1997); Walker, 175 F.R.D. at 230-31; NATIONAL BANKR.
REvIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT: BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 337
(photo. reprint 1999) (1997), reprinted in MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 4, app. F-4;
1999 Report, supra note 6, at 41; Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class
Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155,
1174 (1998).
148. See Clement, 176 F.R.D. at 32; Laughman v. Wells Fargo Leasing Corp., No.
965925,1997 WL 567800, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2,1997); Walker, 175 F.R.D. at 233.
149. See Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252,270 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Cincinnati Radiation
Litig., 187 F.R.D. 549,551-52 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Cohen, supra note 19, at 285; cf. Cabraser,
supra note 28, at 83, 85, 125 (arguing that Amchem has a narrow holding that should have
a limited impact on class action jurisprudence).
150. Whether this heightened scrutiny applies to non-mandatory classes, in which the
right to opt out of the settlement affords claimants at least a measure of protection not
present in limited fund classes, is open to question.
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protecting settlement classes into a weapon that courts must use
against them. The Court held that, when class certification is for
settlement only, "the moment of certification requires 'heightene[d]
attention' to the justifications for binding the class members.... [A]
fairness hearing under Rule 23(e) is no substitute for rigorous
adherence to those provisions of the Rule 'designed to protect
absentees,' among them subdivision (b)(1)(B)."''11 By conspicuously
omitting all Amchem language that had suggested relaxed or even
equal scrutiny for settlement classes, Ortiz makes it clear that the
certification standard has been tightened substantially for proposed
mandatory settlement classes. Such heightened scrutiny, taken alone,
may not prove invariably fatal to future limited fund settlements, but
it sends a clear signal to litigants and lower courts that alternatives to
such settlements should be considered.
Ortiz landed a second, more telling blow to limited fund
settlements with its treatment of conflicts within the proposed class
and the requirement of appointing separately represented subclasses
to address them. 52  Here, too, the Ortiz holding must be viewed in
light of Amchem's holding and the division in the lower courts that
ensued. Amchem had suggested that subclasses were required when,
"[i]n significant respects, the interests of those within the single class
are not aligned.' 1 53  Some, including Judge Smith of the Fifth
Circuit,5 4 concluded that Amchem required that any conflict within
151. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2316 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
620 (1997)) (alterations in original). In Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., a case decided after
Ortiz, the Eighth Circuit held that the heightened scrutiny of class certification that had
been mandated by Amchem and Ortiz did not apply when over three years of discovery
preceded the settlement and when the settlement was reached several months after class
certification. Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., Nos. 98-3816, 99-1334, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
34295, at *5-6, *17-18 (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 1999). The court asserted that because of the
extensive pretrial activity, the danger of collusion between the defendant and the class
counsel was "not present here." Id. at *6. Applying a "deferential" abuse of discretion
standard of review, the court upheld certification of the class. Id at *2, *5, *6.
152. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
153. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626. But see TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 29 ("The
[Amchem] Court did not, however, suggest whether subclasses would necessarily have
solved the problems of adequacy of representation."); Cohen, supra note 19, at 315-16
(stating that Amchem did not resolve the issue of whether every subclass must have its
own representative or its own counsel); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose:
The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L REv. 1465,
1489 (1998) (observing that Amchem does not explicitly require separately represented
subclasses for conflicts in the proposed class).
154. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan II"), 134 F.3d 668, 677
(5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that "any real conflict, even if minor when
compared to interests held in common, will render the representation inadequate"), rev'd
and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
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the class, no matter how minor, result in the appointment of
subclasses.15 A clear majority of courts, however, concluded that
only substantial conflicts require subclasses. 156
Given the sharp debate in the lower federal courts and in the
academic literature, the Court must have been aware that an issue
existed whether the obligation to create subclasses was limited to
intra-class conflicts that were deemed substantial.15 7 Thus, when the
Court discussed the conflicts that required subclasses in Ortiz, the
absence of any language limiting that requirement to substantial
conflicts, or even noting that the conflicts in Ortiz were substantial,
strongly suggests that no such limit exists 58 The Court established
155. See id. at 670; John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After
Amchem Products-Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their Clients'
Money, 84 VA. L. REV. 1541, 1543, 1550-54 (1998); Silver & Baker, supra note 153, at
1491-1500.
156. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no need
to create subclasses in a nationwide class when variations in state law were "not
sufficiently substantial" and differences in damages and potential remedies were
"relatively small"); Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
Sales Practices Litig.), 148 F.3d 283, 313 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that when class members
share an interest in establishing the same "crux" issue, adequacy of representation is
satisfied), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 525 U.S. 1114
(1999); Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (explaining
that "'only a conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a
party's claim of representative status' " (quoting Krueger v. New York Tel. Co., 163
F.R.D. 433, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (internal quote marks and citations omitted)); Fanning v.
AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158, 176
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding subclasses unnecessary "[b]ecause there are no great divergent
conflicts" in the class); In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 292 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (noting that "the [c]ourt must make an evaluation to determine which variances are
important or substantial enough to ... require subclasses"); see also Coffee, supra note
155, at 1553 (noting that "it is far from clear that Amchem Products will be extended so as
to require subclasses (or, in any event, separate counsel) for every material difference
among class members").
157. Cf. Silver & Baker, supra note 153, at 1486 (writing before Ortiz was handed down
that the issue of whether all class conflicts necessitated separately represented subclasses
was before the Ortiz Court).
158. The significance of the Court's refusal to limit the subclass obligation to
substantial conflicts seems particularly clear in light of the fact that evidence of the
substantiality of the conflicts in Ortiz was readily available. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Ahearn
(In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan I"), 90 F.3d 963, 1013 n.49 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (noting that pre-1959 claims had been settling for three times the value of post-
1959 claims), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaffd per curiam, 134 F.3d 668
(5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295
(1999). Note that an argument could be made that the strict obligation to create
subclasses enunciated in Ortiz does not apply outside the limited fund context, because the
historical model created the obligation, not Rule 23(a)(4). But see Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320
(noting that the failure to create subclasses for present and future claimants in Ortiz was
"as contrary to the equitable obligation entailed by the limited fund rationale as it was to
the requirements of structural protection applicable to all class actions under Rule
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the need for subclasses on the bare statements that the class was
"divided between present and future claims"'59 and "[p]re-1959
claimants accordingly had more valuable claims than post-1959
claimants."'16 Such conflicts created "disparate interests" among class
members that fell "well within" the requirement to create
subclasses.'6' The Court may have stopped short of the position that
no conflict is de minimis, noting that "at some point there must be an
end to reclassification with separate counsel."' 62  Even this
concession, however, seems a deliberate retreat from the language in
Amchem suggesting that subclasses were required only when the
interests of claimants clashed "[i]n significant respects."'63 In short,
whether any broad discretion to exempt insubstantial conflicts
survives Ortiz is open to question.64
23(a)(4)" (emphasis added)); Glickstein et al., supra note 135, at 319 (reading the stricter
obligation to create subclasses established by Ortiz to apply to opt-out classes as well).
159. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2319. The Court elaborated only to note that "'for the
currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments,' but '[t]hat goal tugs
against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected
fund for the future.'" d at 2319-20 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 626 (1997)). Here again, the Court appears deliberately to avoid any suggestion that
the conflicts within the class need to be substantial before subclasses are required.
160. Id. at 2320 (citation omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id (emphasis added).
163. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626. But see Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2331 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(interpreting the majority's "at some point" language to oblige courts to balance the
advantages and disadvantages of increasing the number of attorneys involved in the
litigation).
164. In Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., Nos. 98-3816, 99-1334, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34295
(8th Cir. Dec. 30, 1999), a case decided on December 30, 1999, the Eighth Circuit reached
a profoundly different conclusion, one that only can be described as not reconciled easily
with Amchem and Ortiz. In Petrovic, a group of property owners brought suit for
property damage against the defendant oil company. See id at *1. The suit was certified
as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3). See id at *5-6. The parties then negotiated a
settlement that divided class members into three groups. See id. at *2. Under the terms of
the settlement, the class members in the first group received compensation equal to 54%
of the value of their property. See id at *3. Those in the second group received a
guaranteed payment of $1300. See iii Class members in the third group received no
guaranteed compensation at all, despite the fact that the settlement granted the defendant
easements on their properties to clean up the oil spill. See id at *3, *27. The Eighth
Circuit panel upheld the district court's refusal to appoint any subclasses. See id at *7.
Despite the glaring disparity in the allocation formula applied to groups within the class,
see id at *3, and despite evidence that the underground oil was migrating such that future
claimants might be left uncompensated for their injuries by the settlement, see id. at *9,
the panel concluded that the "stark conflicts of interest that the Supreme Court discerned
in Amchem and Ortiz are [not] present here." I& at *8. This conclusion was based in part
on the court's observation that intra-class conflicts were minimized because all class
members stood to gain from the settlement. See id at *12. In Amchem and again in Ortiz,
the Court emphatically rejected the argument that the common interest of class members
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Unquestionably, the strict standard regarding subclasses imposed
by Ortiz will discourage the use of the limited fund settlement in mass
torts. Professor Green has remarked vividly that "in a mature
litigation in which the landscape is littered with the bankrupt bodies
of many major defendants, the balkanization of a large class of toxic
tort victims into several subclasses seems to be a prescription for
heightened conflict as opposed to efficient resolution."165 Moreover,
Professors Silver and Baker have argued that intra-class conflicts are
so pervasive that "a firm 'no-conflicts' line ... means the end of class
actions."'166 In the aftermath of Ortiz, the accuracy of that prediction
will be tested.
The difficulty of certifying limited fund settlement classes after
Ortiz does not depend simply on those questions that the Court
answered in its opinion. Uncertain law can be just as strong a
deterrent to litigation as unfavorable law,'67 and Ortiz leaves a great
deal of uncertainty in its wake. The Court left unresolved a
substantial number of questions, the negative answer to any one of
which could scuttle certification of limited fund mass tort classes.16
in securing a settlement could paper over intra-class conflicts. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at
2320-21; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622-23; see also supra note 151 and infra note 207
(discussing other aspects of the Petrovic decision).
165. Green, supra note 67, at 1778; see also Coffee, supra note 155, at 1553 (explaining
that "the result is to balkanize the class into an unmanageable assortment of small
subclasses that cannot easily act in concert"); Cohen, supra note 19, at 315-16 ("It is
possible to certify so many subclasses that the efficiencies of the class device are lost.").
Furthermore, observers writing after Ortiz have predicted that the burden of managing a
more cumbersome class structure will deter trial judges from certifying class actions. See
Glickstein et al., supra note 135, at 320.
166. Silver & Baker, supra note 153, at 1493; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 1444
(acknowledging the argument that mass tort class settlement would be impossible if any
allocations within a class were suspect). Others, striking a less apocalyptic tone, have
suggested that increasing the number of subclasses may increase the fairness of the
process. One leading plaintiffs' attorney has suggested that more rigorous subclass
creation "may complicate and prolong the procedures by which a class action settles, or a
settlement class is created or approved, [but] it does not invalidate such procedures, and in
'the long run may ensure that these mechanisms worked to the greater benefit of class
members." Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Recent Developments in Nationwide Products Liability
Litigation: The Phenomenon of Non-Injury Products Cases, the Impact of Amchem and
the Trend Toward State Court Adjudication, and the Continued Viability of Carefully
Constructured Nationwide Classes in the Federal Courts, SC33 ALI-ABA 1, 26 (1998),
available in WL, ALI-ABA database; see also Marcus, supra note 134, at 897 (arguing that
increasing the difficulty of reaching settlement is good because "settlement should not be
achieved at the expense of discernable subgroups who lack separate representation").
167. The deterrent effect of uncertain law is likely to be particularly powerful in the
mass tort context, in which "[n]egotiating is expensive, and parties are reluctant to invest
in negotiations that are bound to fail." Silver & Baker, supra note 153, at 1473.
168. See Mullenix, supra note 32, at B12 (suggesting that Ortiz left critical issues
unresolved "that are destined to cause mischief in the lower federal courts").
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The net effect of such uncertainty will be to leave limited fund
settlement classes looking like a poor gamble indeed.
Among the critical questions left open are the following:
* Can unmanifested injuries satisfy the Article IlI injury-in-fact
test for standing, and can future claimants satisfy the case or
controversy requirement? 169
* To what extent is notice required in a mandatory class, and can
it ever be adequate to class members, such as mass tort future
claimants, who are unaware of their injuries? 17°
* Do settlements that involve interstate classes with claims under
non-identical state laws comport with the Rules Enabling Act if
claimants are not divided into subclasses by state?' 7'
e Do settlements involving damage claims that abridge
claimants' access to individual trials violate their Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial?172
D Is it sufficient for the proponents of a limited fund settlement
169. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2307. See generally Jeremy Gaston, Note, Standing on Its
Head. The Problem of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 TEX. L. REV. 215,
224-58 (1998) (discussing standing for future claimants and proposing that claimants
without manifested injury be denied standing); Leading Cases, supra note 101, at 313
(asserting that had the Court opted to address the issue, it probably would have concluded
that future claimants do not meet the constitutional requirements for standing). The
author of the latter piece argued that the Ortiz Court should have seized the opportunity
to hold that future claimants lack standing, thus forcing Congress's hand to enact a
statutory solution to asbestos litigation. See Leading Cases, supra note 101, at 314; see also
supra note 126 (discussing potential congressional asbestos legislation).
170. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2312 n.19; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
THIRD § 30.45 (1995) (stating that future claimants "cannot be given meaningful notice");
Cramton, supra note 57, at 835 (arguing that notice to future claimants cannot satisfy due
process); Rutherglen, supra note 78, at 271-77 (arguing that the Federal Rules should be
amended to require that the necessary level of notice be determined on a case-by-case
basis); Todd W. Latz, Note, Who Can Tell the Futures? Protecting Settlement Class Action
Members Without Notice, 85 VA. L. REV. 531, 532-68 (1999) (arguing that closer scrutiny
of the adequacy of class representation can overcome lack of notice to future claimants).
171. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314; see also Wish v. Interneuron Pharms., Inc. (In re Diet
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. MDL 1203, CIV. A. 98-20594, 1999 WL 782560, at *13
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999) (rejecting, on Rules Enabling Act grounds, a settlement that
failed to account for different state law remedies available to different class members); cf
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300-02 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
problem of different state laws in nationwide classes). One commentator also has
suggested that the supplantation of bankruptcy by limited fund class actions may be found
to violate the Rules Enabling Act. See Resnick, supra note 104 (manuscript at 8 n.9).
172. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314-15; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Association of
Trial Lawyers of America in Support of the Petitioners at *13-18, Ortiz (No. 97-1704),
available in 1998 WL 464927 (arguing that the Ortiz settlement violated the Seventh
Amendment by shifting claims to a non-jury tribunal without a valid waiver of the class
members' rights).
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to show a substantial probability that individual claims would
compromise the rights of other claimants, rather than an
inescapable certainty of such compromise?'73
* Are any mass torts mature enough to provide a court with an
adequate basis for valuation of unliquidated claims? 7 4
In leaving so many unanswered questions in the path of future limited
fund settlers, the Court may achieve through discouragement what it
is reluctant to decree forthrightly-the abandonment of the limited
fund settlement as a tool for resolving mass tort litigation.
To review, this Note has argued that Ortiz has rendered limited
fund settlements so difficult to achieve that future litigants will be
unable to continue to view them as a viable option for resolving mass
tort cases. That is not to suggest, however, that such settlements will
vanish altogether. It is therefore worth exploring the ways in which
Ortiz permits or encourages innovation in structuring future limited
fund settlements and considering whether such innovations are
desirable. Looking primarily to recent limited fund cases in federal
district courts, the discussion below anticipates three innovations that
173. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2316 n.26; see also Hudson, supra note 19, at 698-703
(arguing for a more flexible alternative to the inescapably compromises standard).
Hudson describes such a standard as "perhaps the quintessential example of the 'Catch-
22.'" Hudson, supra note 19, at 699.
174. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2316-17 (assuming without deciding that the litigation
history of asbestos, the most mature of all mass torts, provided a sufficient basis for
valuing aggregate claim value). Mature mass torts are those that have reasonably
complete discovery and an adequate number of cases resolved by verdict and settlement.
See McGovern, Mature Mass Torts, supra note 66, at 659. See generally 1999 Report, supra
note 6, at 22-25 (defining maturity and explaining its significance). The first court to apply
Ortiz to a limited fund certification decision held that, due to the immaturity of the tort
(fen-phen diet drug litigation), the court had an insufficient basis for calculating the total
value of claims against the limited fund. See Wish, 1999 WL 782560, at *7; cf. Feinberg,
supra note 19, at 366-67 (describing the difficulty of negotiating claim values in
settlements of immature torts); Marcus, supra note 134, at 878-79 (noting the extreme
difficulty of computing prospective tort claim values). See generally Drucker, supra note
28, at 215, 229-34 (arguing that class actions arising from immature torts should be
forbidden).
Judicial estimation of mass tort liability has not been an unqualified success. See
Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J.
367, 368-69 (1994) (noting that claim estimation has been a "vexing" problem that has
"haunted" recent mass tort cases). Two major mass tort settlements have foundered after
the value of claims brought against settlement trusts vastly exceeded projections. See
Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d 721, 726 (2d Cir.
1992) (observing that, as a consequence of an unexpectedly high volume of claims, the
multi-billion dollar Johns-Manville trust was virtually penniless after less than two years of
operation), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 77-78
(discussing the failure of a $4.23 billion multi-defendant settlement of breast implant
claims caused by a massive underestimation of claim volume).
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may arise in the jurisprudence spawned by Ortiz.7 ' First, Ortiz likely
will encourage limited fund settlement negotiators to attempt to
sidestep the obligation to create subclasses simply by postponing
allocation decisions until after settlement. Second, Ortiz may be read
to discourage parties from negotiating settlements that measure the
limited fund by the value of the defendant as a going concern.
Finally, Ortiz may encourage limited fund defendants to insist upon
retaining some or all of the savings in litigation costs made available
by the settlement. Each of these three possible readings of Ortiz
would undermine the Court's insistence on fairness for absent class
members.
The Court in Ortiz appears to reinforce the position that even
minor conflicts within a proposed class require creation of
subclasses.'76  As discussed above, this subclass requirement wi
prove deeply problematic to future settling parties.177 Having placed
such a formidable obstacle in the path to certification, however, Ortiz
may have left open a questionable means to avoid that obstacle: the
no-allocation settlement.
The basic rationale for creating subclasses is that class members
with conflicting interests must be represented separately when
allocations of the fund are negotiated.'78 In other words, counsel to a
class cannot make allocation decisions among competing interests
within the class that they represent. That concern is never triggered,
however, if the settlement itself makes no allocation decisions.
79
175. At least two other responses, not discussed in the text of this Note, also may be
anticipated after Ortiz. One is certification of mandatory (b)(1)(B) classes on rationales
other than the existence of a limited fund. The text of (b)(1)(B) includes no express
requirement of a limited fund. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1)(B). Ortiz recognized that
non-limited fund (b)(1)(B) rationales could be argued, but did not reach the issue of
whether such rationales are proper. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2321 n.33. Non-limited fund
(b)(1)(b) classes have been certified. See In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 186 F.R.D.
459, 474 (S.D. Ohio 1999); White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1411 (D.
Minn. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994). The objectors in Ortiz, however, argued
that (b)(1)(B) classes based upon claims exclusively for damages must show a limited
fund. See Brief for Petitioner at *24 n.20, Ortiz (No. 97-1704), available in 1998 WL
464933. The settlement proponents did not agree. See Brief of Respondents Continental
Casualty Co. at *24-30, Ortiz (No. 97-1704), available in 1998 WL 601118.
Another response that can be anticipated after Ortiz is that litigants will turn to
state courts to file their limited fund settlements. A trend to state courts has already been
well identified. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 67, at 2000-01 & n.106.
176. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
178. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2319; Silver & Baker, supra note 153, at 1467,1496.
179. It is important to distinguish between what this Note terms a "no-allocation
settlement" and what might be called an "equal-allocation settlement." In a no-allocation
settlement, all allocation decisions are postponed until after class certification and final
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Because all claimants share an interest in maximizing the settlement
fund, no conflicts materialize until allocation of the fund begins.18 0
Historically, settlement negotiations have encompassed both the
overall size of the fund and its allocation, but no reason has yet been
articulated why they must.181 Allocation decisions can be deferred
until after certification and settlement approval, at which time either
the court or a designated claims administrator allocates the money.Y2
Almost unnoticed, no-allocation settlements already have begun
to appear. In the 1993 case Butler v. Mentor Corp.,1 a federal district
court certified a limited fund mandatory class of breast implant
recipients and approved a $25.8 million settlement.Y No subclasses
were created, and all allocations were left for a court-appointed fund
administration committee.Y8 5 Four years later, another district court
approved a $104 million settlement of orthopedic bone screw claims
in Fanning v. AcroMed Corp.,'86 certifying a mandatory class without
subclasses on a limited fund theory.'87 A claims administrator was
appointed to make all allocation decisions. 8 In holding that there
were no conflicts that required subclasses, the Fanning court pointed
to the fact that all allocation decisions had been postponed.8 9 In both
cases, objectors to the settlements unsuccessfully challenged the
fairness of binding class members without giving them any
settlement approval. In an equal-allocation settlement, by contrast, the allocation is
determined prior to final approval, and the allocation scheme chosen is one of equal
payments to all class members. Ortiz rejected the argument that equal-allocation
settlements cure conflicts within the class. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320. For an argument
that equal-allocation settlements are appropriate when all claims have a negative net
expected value-that is, when litigation costs exceed expected recovery-, see Coffee,
supra note 155, at 1555-56.
180. But see Silver & Baker, supra note 153, at 1509 (arguing that conflicts are also
inherent to earlier phases of the litigation).
181. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that the no-allocation settlement has not become
popular earlier, given that neither party to settlement negotiations has a financial
incentive to negotiate the often complex allocation. See NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note
20, § 9.72, at 9-195; Coffee, supra note 155, at 1549-50.
182. See infra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (describing the use of such
procedures in two recent cases).
183. Butler v. Mentor Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.), No.
CV 92-P-10000-S (N.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 1993) (order approving Mentor settlement class,
certifying Mentor settlement class, and issuing final judgment as to claims against Mentor).
184. See id
185. See id.
186. Fanning v. AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.), 176
F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
187. See id. at 165.
188. See id. at 176.
189. See id
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information regarding allocation. 190 Neither case, however, was
appealed. 191
The theory that no-allocation settlements can be used to
circumvent the obligation to create subclasses largely has been
overlooked by commentators; the fact that such settlements are
already occurring seems nearly to have escaped scholarly notice
altogether. Among the suddenly voluminous literature on mass
torts,'" only one article directly discusses the use of no-allocation
settlements to avoid subclasses. 193 While the November 1998 article
by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr.9 inaccurately identifies Ortiz (and
only Ortiz) as a no-allocation settlement,9 5 his comments nonetheless
bear careful attention. A no-allocation settlement, he wrote, "denies
class members any information about what they will receive as of the
time the settlement is approved; instead, they are forced to buy the
190. See Gibson, supra note 104, app. E at 58,79.
191. See id. at 57, 83. The fact that neither case was appealed probably helps to explain
their relative obscurity. Both cases were examined recently in id. at 46-86.
192. For example, as of February 7, 2000, there were 218 articles in the Westlaw JLR
database with "mass tort" in their titles; more than half were written in the past five years.
Cf. McGovern, supra note 13, at 613-14 (suggesting that, in Amchem, both the Supreme
Court and the counsel for the parties had evident difficulty with the steep learning curve
for mass tort law).
193. In 1997, Professor Resnik, without mentioning subclasses, expressed her opinion
that allocation decisions should not be postponed until after settlement approval. See
Judith Resnik, Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit,
30 U.C. DAvIs L. Rnv. 835, 858-59 & n.88 (1997). Professor Resnik argued that judges
asked to approve settlements "must be provided with information about their facets....
[Q]uestions of inter-class equity should not be postponed to some fictive later stage:
disclosure of methods of allocation of funds or other remedial forms must be provided
prior to the approval of a settlement." ld. at 858-59. Two other sources discuss the
related idea that class counsel may avoid ethical missteps by passing off allocation
decisions to a neutral party. See Feinberg, supra note 19, at 370-71; Paul D. Rheingold,
Ethical Constraints on Aggregated Settlements of Mass-Tort Cases, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
395, 406-07 (1998). Whereas Professor Feinberg endorses the practice, Professor
Rheingold is critical: "While this technique sounds soothing because there is a judge or
equivalent in the picture, in fact much of the vice of aggregate settlement still exists."
Rheingold, supra, at 406.
194. See Coffee, supra note 155, passim.
195. See id. at 1554 n.23. As the Court in Ortiz noted, the decision to treat equally the
unequal claims of those exposed before and after 1959 was itself an allocation decision.
See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320. The limits on recovery and longer payment terms for
claimants who opted to try their claims also effected an allocation, see id. at 2319, as did
provisions that prioritized payment of more seriously injured claimants. See id. at 2326
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit appears to have believed that the
settlement was a no-allocation settlement. See Flanagan v. Aheam (In re Asbestos Litig.)
("Flanagan II"), 134 F.3d 668, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that a
"controlling differenceo" from Amchem was that here "there was no allocation or
difference in award"), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct.
2295 (1999).
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proverbial 'pig in a poke,' and await the subsequent claims resolution
process."' 96  Despite these fairness concerns, Professor Coffee
anticipated general judicial approval of the no-allocation settlement
device.Y7  He predicted that such settlements would become
increasingly popular as a means of avoiding the need for separate
counsel during settlement negotiations."' Requiring separate
representation at the time of allocation, he concluded, "creates an
unfortunate incentive to employ [no-allocation settlements] in order
to avoid intraclass allocations of the settlement fund (and, perhaps
more importantly, the obligation to share the fee award with the
counsel for these other subclasses)." 99
Judicial approval of no-allocation settlements may not be quite
so foregone a conclusion as Professor Coffee suggests, however.
Perhaps the strongest vehicle for challenging the no-allocation
settlement is a court's obligation under Rule 23(e) to find that a class
settlement is fair before approving it.2 The law in this area is largely
uncharted, but at least one court has held that specifics regarding
fund distribution are "truly critical considerations for certification, ' '20 1
and another has found a proposed settlement unfair for the sole
reason that it was insufficiently specific about how settlement funds
actually would be spent.m These cases sound an appropriate note of
caution. No-allocation settlements force trial judges to approve deals
that they do not understand satisfactorily.
In addition to a fairness challenge, a settlement's failure to detail
allocations within the class also could be challenged as inadequate
196. Coffee, supra note 155, at 1554.
197. See UL
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. Rule 23(e) provides: "Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the
court directs." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). This language is understood to require courts to
assess the fairness of any settlement. See supra note 20 (discussing the 23(e) fairness test).
201. Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226,231 n.8 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
202. See Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The
settlement leaves unclear both what new programs it will fund and to what extent existing
Smith Barney expenditures can qualify .... The proposed programs are nowhere
delineated or defined."). The court implied, however, that the specificity problem in the
settlement might be cured simply by allowing the court to retain jurisdiction over disputes
arising after settlement approval. See id. Issues regarding the fairness of no-allocation
agreements also have arisen in the bankruptcy context. See RICHARD B. SOBOL,
BENDING THE LAW 230 (1991) (noting an unsuccessful challenge to the failure to provide
information about projected recoveries in disclosure to claimants arising out of the
bankruptcy of the Dalkon Shield's manufacturer).
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notice. Notice is an issue in class actions because it is one of the
fundamental justifications for an exception to the general rule that
claimants are only bound by adjudications to which they are a
party.203 Rule 23 requires that class members in opt-out classes under
(b)(3) receive the "best notice practicable," but it imposes no
equivalent notice obligation for mandatory class members under
(b)(1). In both types of classes, however, some form of notice is
required before a court may approve a class settlement, in order to
provide class members with an opportunity to offer objections to the
settlement.20 Ortiz expressly left open the question of the degree to
which due process requires notice to mandatory class members.2 6 It
is not clear, then, whether failure to include allocation information
would render notice to a mandatory class inadequate. The Second
Circuit, in a 23(b)(3) settlement of Agent Orange litigation, has stated
that there is no absolute requirement to detail a distribution plan in
notice to class members
203. See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 78, at 264-68.
204. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
205. See i& 23(e) (requiring "notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise ... to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs"); see also Rutherglen, supra note
78, at 272 (explaining the importance of such notice in mandatory classes). See generally
7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1797, at 359-78 (discussing the 23(e) notice
requirement). Rule 23(e)'s notice requirement can be quite demanding: the $18 million
worldwide notice campaign in Ortiz was described by the settlement proponents as the
most extensive ever undertaken in a class action. See Brief of Respondents Continental
Casualty Co. at *47, Ortiz (No. 97-1704), available in 1998 WL 601118; see also
TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 67-68 (describing the Ortiz notice effort); Gibson, supra
note 104, at 42-43, 55-56, 75-76 (describing the notice campaigns employed in three
limited fund settlements).
206. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (noting the Court's non-resolution of
the applicability of notice to mandatory classes). See generally Rutherglen, supra note 78,
at 271-77 (suggesting that current law largely leaves the extent and form of notice for
mandatory classes to the discretion of the trial court and proposing that extensive,
individual notice be required when practical).
207. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 1987)
(indicating that an absolute requirement would unduly "overburden" the parties and the
court). The Eighth Circuit went considerably beyond Agent Orange in Petrovic v. Amoco
Oil Co., a post-Ortiz decision. Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., Nos. 98-3816, 99-1334, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 34295, at *29-32 (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 1999). In Petrovic, all settlement
allocation decisions had already been made before notice of the settlement was
undertaken. See id. at *30-32. The settling parties nonetheless chose to include only the
aggregate settlement amount in the notice to class members, offering no information
regarding individual recoveries, see id- at *29, despite the simplicity of the allocation
provisions, see id. at *2-3 (describing the essential compensation terms in three sentences
totaling under 100 words), and despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of class
members were to be denied any monetary recovery, see id. at *3 (observing that
"approximately 5,000" of the "more than 5,000" class members "receive no guaranteed
compensation"). The Eighth Circuit panel concluded that the notice was adequate,
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
As Professor Coffee's "pig in a poke" observation illustrates, 0
however, notice that is silent on the issue that each class member
would be expected to care about most-the amount that each will
recover-seems anything but adequate.2 9 A class member's right to
object to a class settlement before it is approved is drained of its
vitality if the fact most likely to trigger that objection is simply
omitted. At the time when they have a chance to object to the
settlement, all that class members know is that the total amount-in
millions or billions of dollars-sounds like a considerable amount of
money. If the plan actually undervalues the worth of the defendant,
the class members will have little reason to undertake the difficult
task of valuing the defendant independently. Class members, no less
than trial judges,210 are entitled to know the details of allocation
before the approval of a settlement.
A second important post-Ortiz issue involves the means available
to calculate the value of the limited fund defendant. Defendant
valuation is critical to both the inadequacy element and the
exhaustion element of Ortiz's historical model 1  Without a firm
grasp on how much the defendant is worth, it may be impossible to
meaningfully establish either the value of the limited fund or its
exhaustion." Accurately calculating how much the defendant is
worth, however, is often more complicated than merely totaling up
observing that a telephone number was provided in the notice that class members could
have called to ask for data on potential awards. See id. at *32. Other aspects of this
questionable decision are discussed supra at notes 151, 164.
208. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
209. See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 20, § 8.32, at 8-106 (explaining that notice
under 23(e) generally should include the formula by which settlement funds will be
distributed); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protections for the
Class and the Case for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REv. 646, 692 (1994) ("The failure to give
adequate notice of a settlement plan of distributions ... contributes to the egregious lack
of protection afforded to class members."); Latz, supra note 170, at 556 (arguing that
notice to class members should include a means of calculating individual recoveries). But
see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD, § 30.212 (1995) (urging that notice
should explain allocation procedures and clearly set out differences in relief, but noting
with apparent approval the practice of postponing allocation decisions until after
settlement approval); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1787, at 220-21 (stating that
settlement notice "may" include information on allocation).
210. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 102-23 and accompanying text (describing the limited fund
historical model enunciated in Ortiz).
212. See supra notes 100-23 and accompanying text. At least hypothetically,
exhaustion could be established without an accurate valuation of the defendant, if the
settlement simply transferred total ownership of the defendant corporation to the class. In
reality, however, it is hard to see how a settlement effecting such complete surrender could
ever be in a defendant's interest.
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the sum of its assets 3 A going concern valuation, because it takes
account of a defendant's projected future earnings as well as its
present assets, will, at least in theory, often result in a substantially
larger fund.214 Just as a college student may have few tangible assets
but considerable future earning potential, the value of a defendant
company's future earning capacity may greatly exceed the sum of its
present assets.
The Supreme Court has long recognized going concern analysis
as the appropriate means for corporate valuation, at least in the
bankruptcy context.2 15 In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du
Bois,2 16 the Court noted that " 'the commercial value of property
consists in the expectation of income from it.' "21? The Court
213. See Marcus, supra note 134, at 879 (explaining that calculating a mass tort
defendant's assets "is much more complicated than obtaining a simple net worth figure
from the defendant's books").
214. See In re Mobile Freezers, 146 B.R. 1000, 1002 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (observing that
bankruptcy reorganization envisions that "the continued operation of the debtor will
result in a stream of earnings ... whose present value is greater than the liquidation value
of the firm"), affd per curiam sub nom. Mobile Freezers, Inc. v. United States, 14 F.3d 57
(11th Cir. 1994) (mem.); Donald S. Bernstein & Nancy L. Sanborn, The Going Concern in
Chapter 11, in CHAPTER 11 BusINEss REORGANIZATION 1993, at 157, 159 (PLI Com.
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A647, 1993) (describing bankruptcy policy
of rehabilitating and preserving troubled business "if continuity of its operations and
management-i.e., maintaining the business as a going concern rather than liquidating-
would maximize recoveries by creditors and shareholders"). See generally 7 COLLIER,
supra note 22, 1129.06[2], at 1129-153 to -170 (describing going concern value and
various methods for calculating it); MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BusINEsS
REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY 741-60 (1996) (same); Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W.
Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 Bus. LAW. 419, 420-36 (1996) (same). Theoretically, a
limited fund settlement based on a going concern valuation could be structured in at least
three different ways: an initial lump sum payment to plaintiffs with money borrowed
against the defendants' future earning potential, see, e.g., Fanning v. AcroMed Corp. (In re
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1997),
installment payments, see, e.g., Wish v. Interneuron Pharms., Inc. (In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig.), No. MDL 1203, CIV. A. 98-20594, 1999 WL 782560, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,
1999), or transfer of some fraction of the company's stock to plaintiffs, see, e.g., Gibson,
supra note 104, app. E at 34 (describing Eagle-Picher bankruptcy reorganization terms).
215. See 7 COLLIER, supra note 22, 1129.06[2][a], at 1129-155. Similarly, when the
value of a corporation must be calculated to determine dissenters' rights in a corporate
acquisition, it is "well settled in case law.., that fair value is based on going concern value
and not on the liquidation value of the corporation." Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Fair
Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 N.C. L. REv. 101, 118 (1999). Professor
Campbell notes that "[flundamentally, under modern finance theory, the present value for
any company... is determined by discounting the expected cash flows to be derived from
the company in the future." Id. at 151.
216. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
217. ld. at 526 (quoting Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 226
(1908)); see also Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 442 n.20 (1968) (defining
reorganization value as the "present worth of future anticipated earnings" (citing Jerome
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recognized, however, that such valuation was necessarily inexact:
"Since its application requires a prediction as to what will occur in the
future, an estimate, as distinguished from mathematical certitude, is
all that can be made."21  That recognized imprecision,219 however,
contributes to making going concern valuation an uneasy fit under the
historical model analysis. Can such "an estimate, as distinguished
from mathematical certitude," satisfy the Ortiz requirement that the
size of the fund be "set definitely at [its] maximum[]"? °0
One federal court has already applied Ortiz in rejecting a going-
concern-valued limited fund settlement, noting "[tihe difficulty in
identifying, with any certainty, the scope of the fund."'2 The same
court had approved a limited fund settlement based on a going
concern valuation two years earlier.m Another district court rejected
a going concern settlement in 1997, noting that "a limited-fund
finding would have been facilitated greatly by the presence of a
discrete, identifiable res rather than the amorphous corporate entity
proffered by the parties." -3 With many courts already outside their
expertise when asked to assess conventional corporate valuation,1 4
and with Ortiz mandating heightened scrutiny of limited fund
settlements, the going concern settlement may be doomed by its
imprecision z 6
Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission
in the Administration of Chapter Xof the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U. L. REV. 317,342 n.68
(1941))).
218. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co., 312 U.S. at 526 (citations omitted).
219. Accord In re Pullman Constr. Indus., 107 B.R. 909, 932 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)
(describing going concern valuations as "only educated estimates"); 7 COLLIER, supra
note 22, 1129.06[2][c], at 1129-69 (noting that going concern valuation is "much like 'a
guess compounded by an estimate'" (quoting Peter Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 301, 313 n.62 (1982))); Pantaleo &
Ridings, supra note 214, at 436-40 (explaining the difficulty that courts have faced in
accurately valuing corporations).
220. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2311.
221. Wish v. Interneuron Pharms., Inc. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. MDL
1203, CIV. A. 98-20594, 1999 WL 782560, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,1999).
222. See Fanning v. AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.),
176 F.R.D. 158,168-70 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
223. Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226, 233 n.11 (S.D. W. Va. 1997); see
also Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan II"), 134 F.3d 668, 670-71
(1998) (Smith, J., dissenting) (asserting that a corporation valued as a going concern
cannot constitute a limited fund), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
224. See Campbell, supra note 215, at 104 (noting that cases involving corporate
valuation "can be puzzling for courts unaccustomed to the world of corporate finance").
225. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 218-20 and infra note 234 and accompanying text.
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As if the difficulty of establishing inadequacy were not enough,
the exhaustion element of the historical model increases the
complexity of the court's calculation exponentially. Ortiz noted that
exhaustion traditionally requires that "the whole of the inadequate
fund... be devoted to the overwhelming claims." 2 7 That formulation
is fundamentally at odds with going concern settlements, in which the
whole point is to allow the defendant to keep assets sufficient to
continue earning moneyP Even if exhaustion is understood more
broadly so as to require simply that "the class as a whole [be] given
the best deal," 9 the exhaustion element would still present a nearly
insurmountable obstacle if interpreted strictly. The calculation
demanded is inherently nebulous: have the parties perfectly balanced
the need for a maximized payment with the need to leave the
defendant with assets sufficient to maximize, its income and, thus,
maximize its payments?210 Considering both the fact that the settling
parties are before the court in a non-adversarial posture and the ever-
present danger in mass tort settlements that class counsel has "sold
out" the class,23' the court's ability to make such a post-hoc judgment
independently is quite uncertain.P2
If Ortiz is so interpreted, rejection of settlements based on a
limited fund valued as a going concern may be an unfortunate
development. Particularly in cases involving smaller defendants,
going concern valuations have the potential to produce superior
resolutions for all concerned, creating the largest possible recovery
fund while allowing the defendant to survive intact. On the other
227. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2311.
228. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
229. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2311.
230. See Wish v. Interneuron Pharms., Inc. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No.
MDL 1203, CIV. A 98-20594, 1999 WL 782560, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999) (holding
that a proposed limited fund settlement violated the Ortiz exhaustion element because the
defendant corporation was allowed to retain a portion of its assets in order to continue in
business while the class members received a debt instrument to be paid back from the
future earnings of the company). Despite the Wish settlement proponents' argument that
the proposed payment structure represented the best deal possible, id. at *8, the court
stated that" [t]he Wish class's participation in Intereuron's future ... is fraught with risk,
including ... the risks found in financial markets as a whole. Those risks are better
shouldered by Wall Street investors than the members of a compulsory class under Rule
23." Id.
231. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2317-18; 5 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACrICE § 23.84[1] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 1999); Coffee, supra note 2, at
1373-83.
232. Cf. 7 COLLIER, supra note 22, 1129.06[2][c], at 1129-70 (noting the risks inherent
to going concern valuation, because "'formulas, like trained animals, perform according
to what they are fed'" (quoting In re Consul Restaurant Corp., 146 B.R. 979, 986 n.15
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1992))).
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hand, the Court in Ortiz betrays a basic skepticism about the integrity
of mass tort class counsel and the ability of trial judges to ensure that
integrity P 3 The benefits that going concern valuation theoretically
makes possible could, in reality, be swallowed up by the absence of
clear and reasonably ascertainable standards.23 Yet, to reject the
potential benefits of going concern settlements on these grounds is to
declare the inability of the American adversarial system to produce
just results in mass tort litigation. More sophisticated judicial scrutiny
of corporate valuation in settlements, rather than a blanket rejection
of going concern settlements, appears to be the sounder courses 5
A third issue likely to arise in post-Ortiz litigation involves
interpretation of the exhaustion element of the historical model.
When a defendant faces tens of thousands of separate tort claims, it is
far less expensive to negotiate a single settlement than to litigate each
case separately. In mass tort cases, the savings can be in the hundreds
of millions of dollars. 6 Thus, it is hardly surprising that a defendant
in a limited fund case would seek to retain for itself the money that,
absent settlement, it would have spent on defense costs. The question
after Ortiz is whether allowing a limited fund defendant to emerge
from settlement with the saved litigation costs comports with the
exhaustion element of the historical model.
Because mass tort defendants are not, as a rule, motivated by a
strong sense of charity,237 they are likely to enter into limited fund
233. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court's explicit
concern about the danger of collusion in mass tort settlements).
234. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 222 (1977), reprinted in 13 BANKRUPTCY REFORM
AcT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1979) (observing that because of its inherent
uncertainty, going concern valuation is often "a method of fudging a result that will
support the plan that has been proposed").
235. Cf. Campbell, supra note 215, at 104 (noting that courts in jurisdictions that
frequently handle cases requiring complex corporate valuations "in recent years have
done much better in dealing with such issues"); Erichson, supra note 67, passim (discussing
the emerging importance of careful independent judicial scrutiny of class action
settlements).
236. See, e.g., Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 529 (E.D. Tex. 1995), affd
sub nom. Flanagan v. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S.
1114 (1997), reaff'd per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999). To understand what is at stake, consider
a simple hypothetical mass tort defendant. This defendant has total assets of $100 million
available to spend on defense costs, and it faces tort liability that exceeds that amount. If
the defendant litigates each claim individually, it will pay out $60 million in settlements
and judgments and spend the other $40 million on litigation expenses. If, instead, the
defendant negotiates a limited fund class settlement, it will spend only $5 million on
litigation expenses, thus freeing up $35 million.
237. See, e.g., SOBOL, supra note 202, at 13, 172 (describing a mass tort defendant's
apparent effort to discourage claims by interrogating plaintiffs about details of their sexual
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settlements only if they expect better economic outcomes than they
could get through bankruptcy or other forms of aggregated litigation.
Whether the limited fund mandatory class settlement should provide
that better economic outcome remains an open question. Both the
Fifth Circuit and Chief Judge Parker squarely held that limited fund
settlements need not equal what defendants would have paid through
individual litigationP8  Ortiz expressly left the question
unanswered,1 9 although several parts of the opinion cast serious
doubt on the Court's openness to a plan that allows a settling
defendant to retain a portion of its limited fund.
Which standard is appropriate? Should exhaustion focus on the
benefit to the plaintiffs or the cost to the defendant? A plaintiff-
histories).
238. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan I"), 90 F.3d 963, 985
(5th Cir. 1996) ("To the extent intervenors are arguing that certification is improper
because Fibreboard fares better under the class action settlement than under a bankruptcy
proceeding, we find their focus misplaced. The inquiry instead should be whether the class
is better served by avoiding impairment of their interests."), vacated and remanded, 521
U.S. 1114 (1997), reaffd per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub
nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999); Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 527 ("[A]
rule [requiring that a settlement exhaust a defendant's resources] would make no sense,
would discourage settlements and has been rejected. In terms of the expected recovery
for class members, the Global Settlement is far superior to either the Trilateral Settlement
or to no settlement at all." (citations omitted)).
239. 119 S. Ct. at 2322 ("If a settlement thus saves transaction costs... may a credit for
some of the savings be recognized ... as an incentive to settlement? It is at least a
legitimate question, which we leave for another day.").
A related issue, more complicated than the reduced transaction costs issue
addressed by the Court, arises from the fact that the settlement itself could affect the value
of the corporation. For example, in Ortiz, Fibreboard's stock value rose nearly 300% on
announcement of the settlement. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1402. Because the mere fact
of settlement can have a major impact on the defendant's value as a corporation, would
exhaustion require that the parties attempt to anticipate this impact? Cf Campbell, supra
note 215, at 112-16, 122-27, 129-33 (noting that in corporate acquisition cases that require
courts to calculate corporate value in order to determine the rights of takeover
dissenters-when the acquisition itself creates value-courts are inconsistent in factoring
that new value into their calculations of the corporate value). In the corporate acquisition
context, the term for the added value created by the very act that triggers the need to
calculate corporate value is "synergy." Id. at 112.
240. The Court noted that traditional "limited fund cases thus ensured that the class as
a whole was given the best deal; they did not give a defendant a better deal than seriatim
litigation would have produced." Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2311 (emphasis added). The Court
went on to state that a limited fund settlement "requires assurance that claimants are
receiving the maximum fund, not a potentially significant fraction less." Id. at 2323. The
Court expressly rejected the dissent's argument that allowing Fibreboard to retain nearly
all of its assets was permissible because the settlement made more money available than
any likely alternative because "even if we could be certain that this evaluation were true,
this is to reargue Amchem: the settlement's fairness under Rule 23(e) does not dispense
with the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)." Id.
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benefit standard would require only that the settling plaintiffs receive
as much as they would have through individual litigation. Under a
plaintiff-benefit standard, the defendant could retain some or all of
the litigation cost savings resulting from the settlement. The
defendant-cost standard, on the other hand, would require that the
defendant's total payments under the settlement equal what their
total payments would have been absent settlement. Thus, a
defendant-cost standard would ensure that the saved defense costs
would go to the settling plaintiffs.
There is much to be said for allowing a defendant to retain some
portion of the transactional cost savings under a plaintiff-benefit
standard. Defendants would be encouraged to settle and resolve
their claims, thus hastening compensation to victims and relieving
docket congestion.24 Likewise, economically valuable businesses
could retain assets sufficient to remain afloat.2 42 Additionally, a
plaintiff-benefit standard arguably promotes fairness by providing
victims with just as much compensation as they would have received
had all claims been litigated individually. Such a standard ensures
that some money is left over to pay commercial creditors. 43 Finally,
an argument can be made that a plaintiff-benefit standard serves to
counterbalance an "overclaiming" effect attributed to mass tort
litigation.244
Nevertheless, the arguments for a defendant-cost standard may
be more compelling. There is a basic disconsonance in using a limited
fund to force all claimants to accept a diminished share of their
damages, while allowing a defendant to retain a substantial portion of
that fund. Until all plaintiffs receive undiscounted compensation, the
defendant should not recover.245 A plaintiff-benefit standard also
241. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 527 (concluding that a defendant-cost standard would
discourage settlement); Green, supra note 67, at 1798-99 (arguing that encouraging
settlement would produce outcomes that are more efficient and remunerative for asbestos
victims).
242. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2332 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (praising the Fibreboard
settlement for allowing the company to remain in business, a result "far better for
Fibreboard, its employees, its creditors, and the communities where it is located").
243. See Hudson, supra note 19, at 690-97.
244. McGovern, supra note 15, at 1022-23 (suggesting that while in general less than
20% of potential tort claims are pursued, in mature mass torts more than 100% of viable
claims are brought); see also 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 16-17 (same); cf. Drucker, supra
note 28, at 219-20 (arguing that class actions attract so many plaintiffs that they are unfair
to defendants). But see Resnik, supra note 193, at 844 (suggesting that the limited
participation of victims in individual tort litigation "is not an appealing alternative");
Schuck, supra note 126, at 961-62 (arguing that the benefits of the higher claim rate in
mass torts outweigh the negative features of "junk claims").
245. This argument is analogous to the absolute priority rule established by the
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could allow corporate wrongdoers to profit at the expense of those
innocent victims who would have received full compensation through
individual litigation. Finally, on a practical level, a plaintiff-benefit
standard would appear to create incentives for defendants to under-
insure and over-defend.2 46
Ultimately, deciding which standard to use in measuring
exhaustion (like many of the issues considered in this Note) may,
practically speaking, turn on one's views regarding the relative merits
of bankruptcy and limited fund settlements as mass tort resolution
tools. The choice between bankruptcy and class action is a matter on
which courts and commentators are deeply divided,247 with an
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). Under the absolute priority
rule, a debtor's shareholders cannot receive any money from the debtor's estate until all
unsecured creditors have been paid in full. See id; see also 7 COLLIER, supra note 22,
1129.04[4][a],-at 1129-82 to -89 (describing the absolute priority rule). The Court in Ortiz
noted its concern about procedural innovations that would undermine the structural
protections provided to creditors in bankruptcy. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2321 n.34.
246. Because ample insurance would serve to raise the bar for establishing a limited
fund, it would make it more difficult for a defendant to capture the savings available
through a plaintiff-benefit standard limited fund class settlement. Similarly, it might be in
a defendant's economic interest to increase unnecessarily its defense costs, when such an
increase would allow the defendant to establish the existence of a limited fund and thus
capture the transactional savings of an aggregated solution.
247. Perhaps a majority of courts and commentators favor class actions over
bankruptcy, pointing to concerns such as expense, delay, and stigma. See, e.g., Flanagan v.
Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan I"), 90 F.3d 963, 985 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated
and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaffd per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd
and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999); In re
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 459, 475 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Cimino v. Raymark
Indus., 751 F. Supp 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990), affd in part, vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297
(5th Cir. 1998); Cohen, supra note 19, at 320-22; Erichson, supra note 67, at 2016;
Feinberg, supra note 19, at 364-65; Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, The Future of
Mass Tort Claims: Comparison of Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of
Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. REv. 405 passim (1999); Raskolnikov, supra note 24, at 2578-
82; see also Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy
Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1695, 1722 (1998) (noting concerns about
bankruptcy as a tool for resolving future claims in mass tort). A substantial and perhaps
growing group of bankruptcy partisans exists. See, e.g., Keene v. Fiorelli (In re Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 14 F.3d 726, 732 (2d Cir. 1993); NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW
COMN'N, supra note 147, at 334-41; Coffee, supra note 2, at 1457-61; Issacharoff, supra
note 25, at 823-24; Mabey & Zisser, supra note 24, at 494; Marcus, supra note 134, at 881;
William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order out of Chaos, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 837, 840 (1995); cf. Barbara J. Houser, Chapter 11 as a Mass Tort
Solution, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 451 passim (1998) (discussing favorable aspects of
bankruptcy for defendants); Resnick, supra note 104 (manuscript at 4-5) (suggesting that
bankruptcy is an appropriate tool to be used in conjunction with others to aggregate mass
torts). For a balanced discussion of the advantages and shortcomings of both options, see
Willging, supra note 8, app. C at 81-84; Zipes, supra note 2, passim.
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unfortunate dearth of careful research to inform the debate.248 For
present purposes, it is enough to recognize that Ortiz has made
limited fund class certification substantially, perhaps prohibitively,
more difficult and uncertain. A probable consequence is that, barring
congressional intervention,249 more mass torts will be resolved
through bankruptcy1 0
In 1935, the link between asbestos and cancer was reported for
the first time.2 1  In 1974, the first asbestos class action was
attempted. 2 To the dismay and, one senses, the astonishment of
most observers, the American justice system stands no more ready
today to address meaningfully the continuing misery of the victims of
asbestos than it did in decades past.y3 Through that failure, it has
become itself one of those victims.
In his opinion in the case that would become Amchem, then-
Judge Edward Becker wrote, "Every decade presents a few great
cases that force the judicial system to choose between forging a
solution to a major social problem on the one hand, and preserving its
institutional values on the other.' '11 4 Judge Becker chose institutional
values, and in Ortiz, the Supreme Court did the same. A generation
from now the correctness or incorrectness of that choice may be more
apparent. One thing is clear today: the elephants are still thundering
closer, and there may well be one less weapon available to bring them
down.
MATTHEW C. STIEGLER
248. See Jones, supra note 247, at 1722 ("More rigorous scholarship from both the
bankruptcy and civil procedure communities is urgently needed."). One of the few
valuable comparisons of bankruptcy and class actions is a collection of case studies
examining the use of each tool that was published as an appendix to the report of the
Working Group on Mass Torts. See Gibson, supra note 104, app. E.
249. See supra note 126 (discussing proposals and prospects for asbestos legislation).
250. Bankruptcy is not open to all mass torts litigants either, however. See, e.g., In re
SGL Carbon Corp., Nos. 99-5319, 99-5382, 1999 WL 1268082, at *7, *14 (3d Cir. Dec. 29,
1999) (ordering dismissal of corporation's Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition because of a
lack of good faith, on the grounds that the corporation remained free of serious financial
danger at filing).
251. See 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 5; CASTLEMAN, supra note 3, at 50. Professor
Castleman details the extensive evidence of industry knowledge of the harmful effects of
asbestos. See i& at 1-158, 581-697.
252. See Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566,567 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
253. Professor Resnik aptly described this dismay when she wrote that "a good many
judges, lawyers, and other participants ... are struggling with misery that they see around
them and are trying, in a world of second-best responses, to do something useful in the
face of huge problems." Resnik, supra note 193, at 860.
254. Georgine v. Anichem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 616 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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